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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this dissertation was to ascertain what type of employee relations system is 
identifiable in the public services of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, and to 
determine what type of voice regulation is in place in the determination of terms and 
conditions of employment. 
The research was collected using both primary and secondary data designs. In terms 
of primary data designs, interviews we conducted with key informants within the 
employee relations system. This included unions officials and employer 
representatives in South Africa and Namibia, as well as representatives from the 
bargaining councils in South Africa. Due to several difficulties, no interviews were 
scheduled in Botswana. In terms of secondary data designs, documentary data 
relevant to the topic, such as legislation, annual reports and topical literature was 
examined 
The research revealed that the type of employee relations system for public service 
employees chosen by the government as the employer is influenced by the history of 
the country, current political climate as well as the economic development plan of the 
country. The colonial history shared by these countries has left an indelible 
impression on the employee relations terrain in all three countries, as the legacy 
passed on at independence has constrained the choices available to the independent 
government. South Africa and Namibia allow public servants to engage in collective 
bargaining regarding terms and conditions of employment, as well as permitting 
employees to participate in the broader policy arena. Public servants in Botswana are 
only permitted to consult with the employer, and have very little influence on the 
determination of their terms and conditions of employment. 
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The area that this dissertation covers is the structure of employee relations in the public 
service of three Southern African countries (South Africa, Namibia and Botswana). This 
project is an attempt to establish what type of voice regulation employees in the public 
service in these countries enjoy in the establishment of terms and conditions of 
employment Studying employee relations in the public service reveals very interesting 
and infonnative data, as the public service is very important in any country in terms of 
service delivery and the impact employee relations in the public service has on the private 
sector (patel, 2000: 127). 
Structurally, the public service is very different from the private sector. Although there is 
only one employer (i.e. the state), the public service covers a multitude of distinctly 
different sectors and occupations. The public service also differs from the private sector 
in that it is not primarily concerned with the maximization of profit through the 
production and distribution of goods and services, but rather it is geared towards the 
implementation of government policy and to deliver social and economic services. 
Workers in the public service have as much interest as management in ensuring that the 
institution delivers effectively, as they are also consumers of these services (patel, 2000: 
166). Similarly, negotiations regarding, for example, wages do not only impact on 
employees within the public service, but on society as a whole as well. The reason for 
this is that salaries in the public service accounts for a substantial amount of state 
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expenditure and this has a direct impact on the amount of money left in the budget for the 
provision of services to the community. 
Another important point of departure is that the public service in all these countries have 
undergone major changes in the recent past that have had serious consequences for 
employee relations in the public service. All three countries come from a long history of 
colonization that has influenced the independent state's choice of employee relations 
system in both the private and public sectors. Examining the different choices made by 
the three governments in question in this study is revealing in that it illustrates different 
ways of managing employee relations in the public service, as well as highlighting 
problems and difficulties in public service employee· relations. 
This section of the study will provide a contextualization of the study by providing a 
clarification of the concepts to be used, as well as placing the study within a broader 
theoretical framework of public service employee relations and comparative industrial 
relations. A thorough examination of the theory involved will be done in Section 6, 
during the comparative analysis of the three countries. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
• To determine the structure of employee relations in the public service of South 
Africa, Namibia and Botswana 
• To determine the type of voice regulation public servants have in the 
detennination of terms and conditions of employment 
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1.3 CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE STUDY 
1.3.1 CONCEPTUALIZATION 
1.3.1.1 The Public Sector 
Madhuku and Kalula (1997:1) state that the public sector is not expressly defined in 
Southern Africa. They suggest that the public sector generally encompasses 
"public administration (central and local government), publicly administered 
functions (such as education and health) and public enterprises (parastatals) " 
(Madhuku & Kalula, 1997: 1). 
Adler (2000:3) states that the public sector is all institutions under public control where 
direct or indirect political control is exercised through appropriate legislation. The public 
sector is divided into different components which differ in terms of political control, its 
relationship to the national budget, the method of wage determination, employment 
conditions and numbers, and the form of regulation and ownership (patel: 1997: 184). 
The components of the public sector are: 
- the public service (see below) 
state-owned enterprises, where the state has a majority interest 
local authorities, which covers city councils, municipalities, town councils and 
authorities such as regional water service corporations, management committees 
for small holdings and management boards of rural areas 
other, which includes universities and technikons, agricultural marketing boards 
and parastatal institutions 
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(patel, 1997: 185-186) 
1.3.1.2 The Public Service 
The public service is a component of the public sector, and this is the primary focus of 
this study. Madhuku and Kalula (1997:2) state that there is a clear trend in Southern 
African countries to place this component of the public sector under a different labour 
law regime, or to have special provisions in the legislation pertaining just to the public 
service. A broad definition of the public service is that it covers those employees who are 
directly employed by the state to provide a service to the community (e.g. health, welfare, 
education, safety and security), but also includes administrative staff in the various 
national, regional and local departments which are specifically established to ensure the 
effective administration of governmental functions (Adler, 2000:5-6 and Patel, 
1997:185). However, the exact definition of what constitutes a public servant differs in 
each country (Madhuku & Kalula, 1997:2). 
1.3.1.3 Voice Regulation 
To define voice regulation I will use Albert Hirschman's (1970) concepts of exit, voice 
and loyalty. In a nutshell, voice regulation means to what extent employees can use their 
voice to influence their terms and conditions of employment. Generally, the voice 
employees have may lie on a continuum, ranging from no voice (i.e. complete 
management control), to collective bargaining, to complete worker control. 
4 
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Hirschman (1970) developed an analysis of ways consumers of economic products react 
to a drop in performance/quality of products. Parallels may be drawn between this 
analysis and the way employees within a certain employee relations system react to 
lapses in their working conditions. 
Hirschman (1970:1) states that within each society or organisation lapses in efficiency, 
rationality, etc. are inevitable. Each society/organisation is able to continue to exist with a 
certain amount of this, but in order for the society/organisation not to perish, ways need 
to be found to rectify this deviant or dysfunctional behaviour. He states that there are 
generally two ways in which management may be alerted to its failings (Hirschman, 
1970:4). The first is called the exit option, where the consumers ofa product or members 
of an organisation leave the organisation or stop buying the product when there is 
deterioration in the product or service (Hirschman, 1970:21). The second way in which 
management may be alerted of its failings is through the voice option, where, instead of 
leaving, members/consumers express their dissatisfaction with the deteriorated state of 
affairs directly to management, or to another authority to which management is 
subordinate (Hirschman, 1970:30). Although both these options may be seen as effective 
means of getting the organisation back on track, Hirschman (1970:24+32) warns that they 
need to occur within certain bounds. If too many consumers/members exit or 
members/consumers are too vociferous in their complaints, management may not be able 
to bring the organisation back to its original functional level, as there will not be enough 
consumers left to buy the product, or members to sustain the organisation, or the bad 
pUblicity received through the voice option has damaged the organisation too much. 
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Similarly, if too few consumers/members leave or the voice option is exercised too 
quietly, management may not find out that it is failing in one way or the other and 
therefore nothing will be done to fix the problem. 
The exit and voice options can act separately or as compliments to one another. In tenns 
of resources needed (e.g. time, money, energy), the exit option is a lot cheaper than the 
voice option, and, therefore, it may be the favoured option in certain circumstances. 
However, in other circumstances the exit option may not be available, and in these 
circumstances the voice option takes precedence. The exit option is largely unavailable in 
such situations as the family and government. Hirschman (1970:30) states that the voice 
option is a basic function of any political system. Exit and voice can also work as 
compliments to one another. For example, the choice to exit may be dependent on the 
likelihood of exercising the voice option being a success (Hirschman, 1970:37). 
Alternatively, the use of the voice option may be dependent on the relative costs involved 
to the individual, as opposed to the exit option. 
Hirschman (1970:77) also developed what he called the loyalty option, where exit and 
voice co-exist. The loyalty option means resorting to voice where exit is possible, 
"loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice" (Hirschman, 1970:78). In this sense, 
loyalty acts as a barrier to exit, and serves the function of stimulating the creative use of 
voice to prevent deterioration from becoming cumulative and destroying the organisation 
(Hirschman, 1970:79-80). Loyalty plays an important role because of the possibility of 
disloyalty, i.e. exit. This gives the consumers/members an ideal bargaining power, as 
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their voice is bolstered by the threat of exit (Hirsc~ 1970:82). It is possible to 
redesign organisations to make the voice option the preferred choice of 
consumers/members by developing new channels of communication (Hirsc~ 
1970:42). One sees this often in modem industrial society, with many new participative 
styles of management having arisen. 
When one is examining a particular employee relations system, it is useful to think in 
terms of what the interplay between the exit and voice options are. This may assist one in 
understanding the dynamics of the system, as it is this interplay that impacts on the 
functioning of the employee relations system. 
Collective bargaining is one type of voice regulation, and it is the prevalent form of voice 
regulation in the public service of South Africa and Namibia, although in the case of 
Namibia this is still mostly only theoretical. To define collective bargaining, I will use 
Patel's (2000: 128) definition, which says it is 
"continuing institutional relationship between an employer and labour 
organizations exclusively representing a defined group of employees". 
He goes further to say that it is 
"concerned with negotiation, administration, interpretation and enforcement 
of written agreements covering wages and salaries, rates of pay, hours of 
work and other conditions of employment". 
It is also useful to define collective bargaining in terms of its purposes which include 
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- A rule making function whereby what is agreed in collective bargaining 
becomes part of individual contracts of employment 
- A nonnative function whereby collective agreements are extended beyond the 
scope of the bargaining unit to individual workers who may not be union 
members 
- A conflict resolution device 
- A regulatory device in which the relationships between the employer and the 
trade unions are defined 
- In respect of the public service, a limitation on the sovereignty of the state 
(Adair and Albertyn, 2000: 813-814) 
1.3.1.4 Employee Relations 
Industrial Relations / Labour Relations / Employee Relations, as it may be 
interchangeably called (I will use the tenD employee relations), refers to the relationship 
that exists between an employee and an employer. This relationship exists whenever 
Hone person (the employee) works for and receives remuneration from 
another person (the employer)" (Bendix, 2000:1). 
Swanepoel (1999:2-5) states that there are many different definitions of employee 
relations, some narrow in their scope and others more comprehensive. Reviewing these 
definitions, one can see that the one commonality that is shared by them all is the focus 
on the interaction between employers and employees. For example, Swanepoel (1999:4) 
cites Anstey's definition of 
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"Essentially, industrial relations is a process through which employers and 
employees interact, and through which they regulate conflict in the 
workplace" . 
Another definition given by Tustin (in Swanepoel, 1999:5) states that 
"industrial relations is an interdisciplinary field of study which concerns itself 
with the continuous process of control over the dynamic individual and 
collective relationship between workers and their management in 
organisations, functioning within the wider environment with a view to 
determining the conditions under which work is done so that the needs of both 
parties are addressed". 
Finnemore (1999:4) states that employee relations is a dynamic process where there is an 
"interplay between cooperation and conflict, between the need to work 
together and the drive to limit each others' power". 
When one is examining a particular employee relations system, one is examining how the 
different actors in the system interact with one another. There are various different 
approaches and perspectives from which one can view employee relations. Following is a 
discussion of some of these perspectives, which may be relevant in the study of the public 
services of the aforementioned countries. 
In the Unitarist perspective, it is premised that there is only one source of authority and 
one focus of loyalty (Fox, 1969:391). The ruling regime is given legitimacy by the 
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premise that the interests of the ruler and ruled are identical (Fox, 1969:395). Conflict is 
seen as anathema to the system, and it is believed to be due to 
"stupidity, wrong-headedness, out-dated class rancor" (Fox, 1969:391), 
a breakdown in communication or agitators (Finnemore, 1999:8). From the Unitarist 
perspective, trade unions are seen as unjustifiably and unnecessarily encroaching on 
management's rule (Finnemore, 1999:8). It follows that management therefore does not 
engage in any fonn of real consultation I negotiation with unions. Finnemore (1999: 176) 
refers to a specific kind of unitarism as "sophisticated paternalistic unitarism and union 
avoidance". She states that from this perspective it is believed that a union free 
environment is more conducive to efficiency and productivity, and many strategies are 
employed to avoid the presence of unions, without actively suppressing them. These 
strategies include: 
o Offering higher wages than the market and more fringe benefits 
o Investing in training and career development 
o Attempt to stabilize employment and avoid retrenchments 
o Implement advanced communication and infonnation sharing systems 
o Implement infonnal mechanisms for participation in decision making 
o Have effective grievance procedures 
o Provide social services 
o Bolster employee identification and commitment through, for example, unifonns 
o Engage in employee stock sharing 
o Develop an elite core of permanent workers who enjoy considerable benefits, and 
a peripheral group of part-time and casual employees 
10 
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Functionalist theory postulates that an employee relations system consists of different 
parts that must interact and be coordinated to ensure the effective functioning of the 
whole (Dunlop, 1958:2-3). Dunlop (1958:7-17) states that these parts are the actors, the 
context, the rules and the ideology. The actors in an employee relations system exist in a 
hierarchy, with management at the top and workers at the bottom (Dunlop, 1958:7). The 
context of the employee relations system is made up of its technological characteristics, 
marketlbudget constraints and the locus and distribution of power (Dunlop, 1958:9). The 
way in which rules and procedures are established, and the administration of these rules 
and procedures is an important part of the employee relations system, as these rules and 
procedures deal with issues such as compensation and rights and duties and 
responsibilities of the parties involved (Dunlop, 1958:13-14). The ideology of the system 
is the ideaslbeliefs held by the actors in that system that binds them to one another. In an 
employee relations system the actors may all have different ideologies. It is important 
that the ideologies are compatible enough to allow for some degree of common ideology 
to develop, which will be recognized and accepted by all the actors in the system. 
The idea that an Industrial Relations system consists of different parts interacting with 
one another, each with their own ideology parallels with the Pluralist perspective. From 
the Pluralist perspective it is postulated that the separate interests and objectives of the 
different parts must be maintained in equilibrium, whilst also accepting that these 
differences do exist (Fox, 1969:398). In this sense there are several loci of authority and 
loyalty, which makes industrial governance difficult as each actor only holds partial 
11 
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minor issues (Fox, 1977:144-145). Collective bargaining, from this perceptive, is also 
seen as an employer strategy to co-opt trade unions into the capitalist frame of reference 
(Swanepoel, 1999:9). 
Finnemore (1999:15) and Swanepoel (1999:9-10) highlight another approach to 
employee relations: Corporatism. Swanepoel (1999:9) cites Maree's definition of 
corporatism as 
"an attempt by government to cope with environmental demands by bringing 
the major actors and, most crucially, organised labour into processes of 
policy formation and implementation on national level ". 
There are two kinds of corporatism: state corporatism and societal corporatism. 
Finnemore (1999: 15) states that state corporatism is the most common form of employee 
relations in developing countries, especially in many African countries where the labour 
movement played a pivotal role in the liberation struggle, but are expected to merge their 
interests with the ruling party after independence. From a state corporatist perspective 
conflict is seen as undesirable, and employee relations are strictly regulated by the state, 
through, for example, regulating the scope and content of collective agreements and 
controlling trade unions. Trade unions in these instances are generally small and weak, 
especially as their leadership had been offered jobs in government in order to ensure their 
loyalty to government policies (Finnemore, 199915-16). 
In societal corporatism great efforts are expended to ensure consensus and agreement to 
ensure stability in employee relations and in society at large. All major role players are 
13 
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involved at all levels of decision making, as socio-economic policy issues are placed in 
the open (Swanepoel, 1999: 10). Societal corporatism is based on the premise of 
democracy, and the relationship between the actors is institutionalized through tripartite 
structures (Finnemore, 1999: 12). From this perspective, conflict is seen as natural and is 
dealt with through centralized negotiations (Finnemore, 1999:12). 
1.3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.3.2.1 Public Sector Employee Relations 
Historically, all over the world, public sector employee relations have developed 
separately from the private sector. Public servants were subject to separate legislation, 
which was more restrictive than the private sector. This was traditionally justified by the 
idea of the sovereignty of the state and was accompanied by the unilateral detennination 
of tenns and conditions of employment by the state as employer (Morris & Fredman, 
1993:115 and True, 1987:1). Some commentators believe that employee relations in the 
public service cannot mimic employee relations in the private sector, as the primary 
responsibility of the government is towards the public and not to only a particular 
grouping of people representing their particular interests. However, others state that 
collective bargaining is the best way for unions to represent the interests of their members 
and that all workers should have the ability to influence their terms and conditions of 
employment. They state that it is possible to do this whilst keeping the interests of the 
wider community at heart and placing bargaining within the parameters set by the state as 
the primary source of social services (Kochan & Katz, 1988:423). The trend 
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internationally has been to include public sector workers under the ambit of labour 
relations legislation and to extend collective bargaining to them. 
Two aspects of public sector employee relations means that it is, and will always be, 
substantially different from employee relations in the private sector. The first aspect is the 
dual role of the state as the employer and the state as government. This means that the 
state is accountable to a wide constituency. The second aspect is the state's source of 
revenue, which is mostly from taxation. Therefore the state is subject to political and 
macroeconomic constraints. This is markedly different from the private sector where 
employers create revenue from the sale of goods and services (Morris & Fredman, 
1993:123 and Kochan & Katz, 1988). This has wider implications for collective 
bargaining in the public service. For example, questions on the size of the workforce, pay 
levels and conditions of employment are political, not commercial judgments. This also 
means that due to the state's subordination to parliament, a certain measure of unilateral 
control and decision-making is always retained (Morris & Fredman, 1993:124-125) 
Structurally the public service is very different from the private sector. Although there is 
only one employer, the public service covers a multitude of distinctly different industries 
and occupations. Thus, creating a coherent employee relations system, catering to the 
needs of all the different actors, without compromising the sector as a whole, is a very 
difficult task. The public service also differs from the private sector in that it is not 
primarily concerned with the maximization of profit through the production and 
distribution of goods and services, but rather it is geared towards the implementation of 
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government policy and to deliver social and economic services. Workers in the public 
service have as much interest as management in ensuring that the institution delivers 
efficiently, as they are also consumers of these services (patel, 2000b:166). Wages and 
salaries, and other terms and conditions of employment with monetary implications 
impact on the broader society, as salaries in the public service account for a large portion 
of state expenditure, which impacts directly on the amount of money left over in the 
budget for the provision of services to the community. Thus, there appears to be a trade 
off between wages and service delivery (Hassen, 2000a:12). 
When collective bargaining rights were extended to public service employees in 
developed countries, it tended to be highly centralized due to the bureaucratic nature of 
public sector control (Adair and Albertyn, 2000:814). However, there has been a trend 
internationally to devolve more and more power and authority in decision making to 
managers at local level, in the wake of many neo-liberal debates about what services the 
government should provide and alternate means of organizing the public service in order 
to reduce government expenditure. 
1.3.2.2 Comparative Industrial Relations 
Comparative industrial relations is a systematic study of the similarities and differences 
that can be identified in the industrial relations systems of two or more countries, and it is 
an analysis of the reasons behind these similarities and differences. The benefits of 
comparative industrial relations studies include that one can place a particular industrial 
relations system into context by examining it in relation to other industrial relations 
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systems, and it enables one to analyze specific practices and/or institutions of certain 
industrial relations systems that appear to be successful. Cne can then explore ways of 
adapting and/or modifying the practice or institution in ones own system (Bean, 1994:4-
7). Comparative industrial relations, however, emphasizes the difficulty of exporting an 
institution 0 practice from one system to another system without having regard to the 
specific cultural, historical, social, political and economic context of that system (Bean, 
1994:5-6). A potential problem with comparative industrial relations is that it is a 
multidisciplinary exercise; so finding the appropriate standards of comparison amongst 
such a wide variety of possibilities is difficult Also, countries differ vastly in their 
terminologies of certain processes and institutions, which may hinder the comparative 
analysis (Bean, 1994: 15-16). 
Bean (1994:8) states that the aim of comparative industrial relations is to 
"promote wider understanding of, and foster new insights into, industrial 
relations either by showing what is unique about any one set of national 
arrangements or, equally well, redUCing what might appear to be acutely specific 
and distinctive national characteristics by demonstrating their recurrence 
elsewhere ". 
An important element of comparative industrial relations is looking at the current 
industrial relations system from a historical perspective. This will bring to light various 
environmental, political and economic factors that have led to the actors making the 
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choices they did, and highlight reasons why a current industrial relations system is 
structured the way it is. 
Bean's (1994) approach to comparative industrial relations focuses on the actors (labour, 
business and the state) within the industrial relations system, as described by Dunlop's 
systems theory. This is different from the approach taken by van Ruysseveldt, Huiskamp 
and van Hoof (1995), which looks at industrial relations institutions and interest 
organizations and their impact on terms and conditions of employment. Wever and 
Turner (1995) and van Ruysseveldt et al (1995) look at comparative industrial relations in 
terms of the impact globalization and increasing international competitiveness has on the 
employment relationship and the industrial relations syst m. 
In comparative industrial relations there is always the question of whether or not 
countries are or will become more similar or more different in terms of the industrial 
relations systems. From reading the works of Bean (1994), Wever and Turner (1995) and 
van Ruysseveldt et al (1995), one can see that there is no straight forward answer to this, 
as, one the one hand, certain industrial relations practices seem to develop across national 
boundaries as countries become more industrialized and developed, but, on the other 
hand, and even within national borders, one sees a disparate array of industrial relations 
practices across different industries, sectors and even companies. 
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This dissertations has looked at comparative industrial relations from a similar angle to 
that of van Ruysseveldt et al (1995), in that it has concentrated mostly on the institutions 
within the industrial relations system as well as the interest organizations within these 
industrial relations systems and their impact on the setting of terms and conditions of 
employment within the public service in these three countries. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is divided into seven sections. Section 2 discusses the way in which the 
research was gathered. Issues of validity and reliability are also considered. 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 are detailed country reports of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. 
In these sections, the empirical findings of the research are presented, as well as a critical 
analysis of employee relations and the concept of voice within these countries. 
Section 6 is a synthesis and comparative analysis of the data presented in section 3, 4 and 
5. The data is also placed within a broader theoretical framework of public service 
employee relations. 
The dissertation ends in section 7 with a conclusion and summary and consolidation of 
the main findings of the research. 
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SECTION 2i METHOD 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation has been exploratory in nature, in that I wanted to become familiar with 
the basic facts regarding the setting of tenns and conditions of employment in the public 
service and to ascertain how voice regulation functions in the public service, as well as 
formulating questions and ideas for future research. Neuman (2000:21) states that 
exploratory research seldomly provides definitive answers as it is primarily concerned 
with answering the question of ''what is this social activity really about". It is also very 
difficult research to do, as there are few guidelines to follow, as everything about a 
particular topic is potentially important 
There are several reason why it was decided to include South Africa, Namibia and 
Botswana in this study. Due to their close geographic proximity and their common 
membership of the SADC group of countries, it was thought that it would be informative 
to discover what similarities and/or differences may be found within the employee 
relations systems in the public services of these countries, and then to explore possible 
reasons for the differences that may be identified. Another reason why these three 
countries were chosen is that I had been involved in a study of bargaining councils in 
South Africa since 2002, in which I specifically focused on the public service. This study 
sparked interest in public service employee relations, especially as there is a dearth of 
studies in this area, not only in South Africa, but across Southern Africa too. 
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This section of the dissertation will highlight the way in which I conducted the research 
to gather the data for this project, as well as examining the issue of the reliability and 
validity of the data gathered. 
2.2 MEmOD OF COLLECTING THE DATA 
Both primary and secondary data design were used during the data collection processes 
of this project Primary data refers to data collected by the researcher him/herself, whilst 
secondary data refers to data that was in existence before the commencement of that 
particular research project (Babbi & Mouton, 2001 :76). 
2.2.1 SECONDARY DATA DESIGNS 
The documentary method of data gathering was used in order to develop the framework 
of data in which to locate this study. In comparative industrial relations one must adopt a 
historical perspective, as the past shapes and informs the present By looking at 
documentary data regarding the history of the countries under consideration, one is more 
able to understand the current context as one can see the ''path of development" of certain 
practices and institutions. 
To collect the secondary data, I searched various documentary sources prior to and 
throughout the duration of this project. The documentary data I accessed pertained to 
employee relations in general and public service employee relations internationally as 
well as with specific reference to the countries under, consideration, as well as 
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infonnation on the history and contemporary context of the countries involved. Some of 
examples of the sources I consulted include official government websites, annual reports, 
constitutions, relevant legislation, as well as other literature with relevance to this study. 
The data presented in this study on Botswana is only drawn from this type of data design. 
Despite numerous efforts to attempt to gain access to people in Botswana, this has proved 
to be unsuccessful. This has an impact on the qualitative side of the information on 
Botswana, and it has meant that I have had to make many inferences from the 
documentary data without being able to verify these through interviews. 
Some of the advantages of documentary research includes that the data is readily 
accessible in the fonn of electronic media, legislation, books, journals, etc., as well as the 
fact that one is able to gQs~refere!lce various written texts with one another in attempt to 
verify the facts. Also, documentary data enables one to access a wide array of views and 
opinions on various phenomena, which one may not be able to access through interviews. 
With this type of research there are always the problems ofva1i~ty and reliability in that 
the writer of these sources could be biased in some way, or that statistics have been 
embellished, as well as relevant data having been omitted. In part, the interviews were 
intended control for this as the infonnation gathered in the interviews could alert me to 
certain discrepancies in the documentary data, as well as, in certain cases, provide 
clarification of ambiguities that may exist in the documentary data. Conducting as wide a 
search as possible of relevant data in order to be able to create some general consensus of 
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what the true facts may actually be, also aids in reducing the impact of individual biases 
on the project as a whole. Another way of curbing the potential negative effects that this 
can have on the project as a whole is by knowing who the authors are and for what 
purposes that particular piece of information was recorded. This will inform one of the 
particular biases that the writer may have. 
2.2.2 PRIMARY DATA DESIGNS 
The primary data for this project was conducted through face-to-face interviews with 
various key informants within the public service of South Africa and Namibia (see 
appendix A for a profile of the interviewees). All the interviews were conducted in the 
offices of the interviewees. The interviewees were selected due to their direct 
involvement in the institutions of establishing terms and conditions of employment in the 
public service. Regarding interviews from the South African public service, data has been 
collected from 2002 as it is already from that time that I have been studying the South 
African public service. The people interviewed include representatives from the 
Department of Public Service and Administration, the Public Sector Coordinating 
Bargaining Council and sectoral councils, and various unions operating in the public 
service. 
In Namibia, I was able interview representatives from the Public Service Commission, of 
which one is a member of the employer" s negotiating team, and a representative of the 
Public Service Union of Namibia (pSUN). Despite repeated attempts via fax, email, 
telephone and personal visits to the National Public Workers Union (NAPWU) (the 
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politically aligned union that has a recognition agreement with the government to 
negotiate collectively), I was unable to secure an interview. The message I received from 
them was initially that I would have to talk to the general secretary, but when I did have 
contact with her, she would always have an excuse why we cannot schedule an 
appointment or talk at that time. I also tried approaching NAPWU through the politically 
affiliation federation of unions (National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW», where I 
was told to speak to the general secretary ofNAPWU. Even with the reference from the 
general secretary of the NUNW, the general secretary of NAPWU still did not want to 
commit to an interview. I am not sure why the unions are so reluctant to participate in 
research, aside from speculating that they view outsiders with severe mistrust. The 
politically affiliated unions in Namibian have established their own "research wing" 
known as the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI). Perhaps the unions think 
that they do not stand to gain anything from participating in my project, as they already 
participate in research through LaRRI. 
As mentioned previously, I was unable to conduct any interviews with respondents from 
Botswana. Through a fellow student (who is from Botswana), I discovered that I had to 
fill out an application form in order to get permission from the government to conduct 
research in the country. I completed the form and submitted it to the Botswana High 
Commission in Windhoek, Namibia. When I at first contacted the High Commission, I 
was told they had no feedback at that stage, and when I contacted the High Commission 
again, I was told they have no record of my application, which I then re-submitted, but 
still to no avail. I then went onto the official website of the Botswana government and 
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retrieved some telephone and fax numbers of the Directorate of Public Service 
Management Both the fax number and the telephone number given on the website did 
not work, and a letter written to the postal address Gaberone was never answered. 
Furthermore, through my supervisors I received contact details of several people working 
in Botswana who could possibly have acted as gatekeepers to the correct people to 
interview. However, this also proved to be a dead end, as, though I managed to contact 
two people off this list and they both said they would help me, when I faxed through the 
information I needed, they never responded. When I called back to confirm that they had 
received the information, I was told they will call me when they have some information. 
Some of the advantages of collecting data through interviews are that one is able to 
access qualitative data regarding a particular phenomenon. In other words, one is able to 
access how the actors within a system experience it and one can then also see how the 
practice differs from the rhetoric. During interviews, one is also able to probe the 
respondents answers, to get more information or to clarify ones understanding of what 
slhe has said. This method of data collection also has some disadvantages, which include 
that one may not always be able to gain access to the correct people to talk to, and that 
the respondent may attempt to "hoodwink" the researcher by cloaking the truth because 
of a personal agenda. 
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2.3 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE DATA 
There are various techniques one can use in order to enhan~ the validity and reliability 
of one's data:'J have used certain of these in my projec(J kept records as my research 
,/ 
was progressing, with interviewee data and general ideas and concepts that have come 
up. ~s was done to see how the project was progressing, and to be able to make 
adjustments as certain new factors revealed themselves~In the case of South Africa and 
Namibia J have also used the technique of trhmgulation, where the researcher combines 
/ 
different research techniques to gather informatio,n from different perspectives (Babbi & 
.,,// 
Mouton,2oo1 :275-277). This J have done by using both documentary data and interviews. 
Babbi and Mouton (2001:276) note that no matter how careful one is in ensuring the 
reliability, validity and objectivity in ones research project, this will never be completely 
possible-:' But as far as possible J have attempted to ensure that the information collected 
and reported in this dissertation is accurate, valid and reliable. ../ 
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SECTION 3: COUNTRY REPORT - SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 mSTORY OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVICE 
Prior to the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, employee relations were 
characterized by severe racism and discrimination entrenched in the apartheid system. 
Prior to 1979, African employees were excluded from the definition of employee, and 
were therefore not covered by the protection afforded to white employees under labour 
legislation, i.e. the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. In the wake of widespread 
industrial and social protest in the 1970's, the Wiehahn Commission was appointed to 
investigate employee relations and make recommendations. The commission's 
recommendations included that African workers should be included in the definition of 
employee, and that Africans be allowed to join and form trade unions. As a result, the 
Industrial Conciliation Act was amended in 1979 to include all Africans (except 
foreigners). The Industrial Conciliation Act was further amended in 1981, and renamed 
the Labour Relations Act. This Act extended administrative controls to unregistered 
unions and abolished the dual system of employee relations by removing all references to 
race from the Act (Maree & Budlender, 1987:117-121). 
In the 1980's unions spearheaded their fight for democracy with the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the liberation 
struggle was pushed forward. This culminated in the unbanning of the ANC and the 
SACP, and the signing of the Laboria Minute in 1990 between the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), other trade unions, the National Manpower 
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Commission and the Department of Manpower. The Laboria Minute contained a clause 
stating that no future legislation on the Labour Relations Act would be put into 
parliament until all major actors had been consulted. This opened the doors for tripartite 
consultations, which culminated in the 1991 Labour Relations Amendment Act, which 
was the fIrst Act in parliament that was a product of trilateral negotiations between the 
state, labour and capital (Maree, 1993: 30). The emergence of engagement between the 
state, labour and business came part and parcel with the broader transition to democracy 
in South Africa. 
Despite the above gains for private sector employees, public sector workers were 
continuously excluded from the ambit of labour legislation; despite the fact that the 1979 
Wiehahn Commission recommended that government include the public service in the 
labour legislation (patel, 2000: 130). Employee relations in the public service prior to 
1994 were characterized by centrally determined conditions of employment, racial biases 
and fragmentation. The Public Service Commission (PSC) was established in 1912 and it 
was the sole determinant of wages and conditions of employment in the public sector. 
Public servants were not permitted to join registered trade unions and nor was collective 
bargaining allowed. The National Party politicized the PSC in its efforts to make the 
public service the instrument to realize its apartheid policy. The public service was 
remodeled in the image of apartheid. Provisions and practices implemented at this time to 
entrench the positions of whites continue to plague the public service (Adler, 2000:8). 
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The Public Servants Association (PSA) was the first employees association to be 
established in the public service in 1922. It represented white, permanent civil servants. 
The PSA was pennitted to engage in consultation through the Public Service Joint 
Advisory Body, which was established by the PSC. It was purely an advisory body with 
no real influence on decision-making (patel, 2000: 129, Macun and Psoulis, 2000:95+96 
and Adler, 2000:7). The apartheid state had fragmented the public service by dividing the 
country into 15 distinct administrations serving 11 "governments",which included the 10 
apartheid-era "independents states" and "self-governing territories", which had their own 
laws and statutes regulating matters within their scope, including labour relations (patel, 
2000: 129, Macun & Psoulis, 2000: 95 and Adler, 2000:5). Until 1980, the PSA was the 
only employee's organization recognized by the state, although there were others such as 
the Medical Association of South Africa. It was only in the late 1980s, when black unions 
within the public service combined their material interests with the widespread 
opposition to apartheid in mass protest, that the Commission of Administration (as the 
PSC was briefly known) granted recognition to the Public Service League, the Public 
Service Union and the Institute of Public Servants. These were all racially based staff 
associations. They were allowed access to the advisory body. However, they had no 
power to negotiate (patel, 2000: 130, Macun and Psoulis, 2000:96 and Adler, 2000: 10). 
In tenns of employee relations theory, the pre-I994 employee relations system in the 
South African public service can be characterized as ''paternalistic unitarism" (Adler, 
2000:9). The Unitarist perspective is premised on the fact that there is one legitimate 
source of authority and one focus for loyalty, and that the interests of the ruled are 
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identical to the interest of the ruler. It then follows that any body seen to be challenging 
the authority of the leader, is seen as anathema to the system, and will not be tolerated. 
From this perspective there is no need for trade unions, as not only are they seen as an 
illegitimate interference into the authority of the leader, but it is felt that the interests of 
the employees are sufficiently catered for by the employer (Fo~ 1969:391+395). And in 
fact this was the case for the white, professionally skilled public servants as the apartheid 
state catered for their needs in terms of higher salaries, better benefits and allowances and 
job security. As such, these employees and their staff associations "bought into·' the 
Unitarist perspective, and did not challenge the authority of the state. This is what 
Finnemore (1999: 176) refers to as "sophisticated paternalistic unitarism and union 
avoidance", where many strategies are employed to avoid unions, and these include such 
things as higher salaries, better benefits, job security, etc .. However, the majority of 
public servants were disenfranchised Africans, whom the apartheid system actively 
discriminated against. In this sense, the Unitarist perspective as applicable to African 
employees took on a more despotic character, as in no way were they permitted to 
participate in the determination of their terms and conditions of employment, and their 
was no recognition of them as employees with interests and needs. This is different from 
the situation as described above for white public servants, whose needs and interests were 
actively protected by the apartheid government 
Together with the transformation to democracy in South Africa, the public service was 
also transformed. (Adler, 2000: 7). The newly elected democratic government had many 
problems it had. to face in the transformation of the public service. These included a 
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fragmented legislative framework, an ineffective system for settling disputes, fragmented 
and ineffective bargaining systems, high levels of labour unrest, and a lack of workplace 
democracy (patel, 1997:182). In 1993 the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) 
and the Education Labour Relations Act (ELRA) came into being and provided for 
collective bargaining within the public service. Also, the Interim Constitution introduced 
a single public service for the country as a whole with a central administration and 
administration of the 9 newly created provincial governments. Another change that came 
about at this time was that labour relations within the public service were transferred 
from the PSC to the newly established office of the Minister for the Public Service and 
Administration (i.e. the Department of Public Service and Administration). In 1995, the 
Labour Relations Act (LRA) repealed the PSLRA and for the first time public servants 
were governed by the same labour legislation as the rest of the work force (patel, 2000: 
129+ 131, Macun and Psoulis, 2000: 100 and Adler, 2000: 1). 
The LRA of 1995 made provision for the establishment of the Public Service 
Coordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC), sectoral councils and councils for provinces 
and departments (patel, 2000: 129). The PSCBC is the key bargaining structure for the 
public service. It is the largest bargaining Council in South Africa, covering about 15% of 
the entire workforce of South Africa and approximately 65% of public sector 
employment It provides a forum for negotiating conditions of employment (e.g. salary 
scales) and other substantive issues that pertain to the public sector as a whole. However, 
it must include special provisions to take sectoral peculiarities into account Currently 
there are four sectoral councils in the public service. Adler (2000: 33) states that the 
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existence of separate bargaining councils in the public service can be attributed to the 
conflict that accompanied democratization and that it is reinforced by the fact that 
historically the ministers in these areas have the legal authority to set wages and 
conditions of service. 
3.2 THE UNIQUE NATURE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE 
3.2.1 The dual role of the state as employer and the government 
The problematic nature of the dual role of the state is especially evident with regards to 
the negotiation of wages in the public service, as this deals with the budget of the entire 
country and it is therefore susceptible to the scrutiny of parliament. The states source of 
revenue is mostly through taxation, which means that government spending is subject to 
political and macroeconomic constraints. This is different from the private sector, where 
employers create revenue from the sale of goods and services by maintaining a 
competitive position in the market (Morris & Fredman, 1993:123). In South Africa, wage 
negotiations are constrained by the ftnancial regulation prescribed by the Constitution 
Act 108 of 1996. The Act established a National Revenue Fund into which all monies 
received by government must be paid, and from which withdrawals may only be made by 
an appropriation by Act of Parliament Therefore, collective bargaining over terms and 
conditions of employment are constrained by the constitutional executive authority of the 
President, through the Minister of Finance, to prepare the national budget for tabling and 
approval in parliament (Christie & Modise, 2000, 1990 and Adler, 2000:28). Parliament 
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can overturn an increase agreed to at negotiations by not voting the amount needed to 
effect the increase (Baskin, 2000: 176) 
The budget of the country is determined before negotiations in the public service start. 
There is no legal requirement that collective bargaining must be synchronized with the 
budgetary process. Rather, collective bargaining entails that the parties be amendable to 
listen to the other side and make concessions where needed (Christie & Modise, 2000). 
Many of the interviewees were of the opinion that the fact that the budget is determined 
before negotiations start, constrains the effective use of voice during collective 
bargaining. Mr. McKenzie from SADTV said that true participation entails that the 
government should listen to the needs of labour, and try to accommodate these needs. He 
went further to say that the current situation is "they give the cake and say let's cut it, but 
what should happen is that we should see how big we can make the cake" (Interview, 
2003). 
3.2.2 Political inOuences 
Many of the unions organizing in the public service are affiliated to the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSA TU) at the national level. Many commentators and 
interviewees are of the opinion that the ANC/SACP/COSA TV alliance has a negative 
impact on collective bargaining within the public service, as the state sometimes bypasses 
the official channels to get an agreement with labour through the alliance. Many of the 
larger unions in the public service are COSA TV affiliates, which mean that for the 
33 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
government to get a majority agreement through the alliance is not a difficult task. Mr. 
Maitaitsane of NUPSA W stated that the problem with the alliance is that COSA TU has 
no true workerist identity, as many of its leaders have political aspirations. He said that 
just as the government lobbies workers through the alliance to support certain 
government initiatives, so too COSA TU could use the alliance to the benefit of workers. 
But this does not happen, as COSA TU leaders have a different political agenda, which 
does not always consider the needs of workers (Interview, 2003). This political alliance 
also influences the shape of bargaining as the election of a democratic government has 
led to expectations of improved wages, and the presence of union leaders in Cabinet, 
Parliament and the PSC increased the expectations of labour further (patel, 2000b: 132). 
However, under the ANC led government, the politicized unions have come under 
increasing pressure to back the policies of their political ally (Adler, 2000: II). Indeed, 
many of the interviewees (COSATU affiliates) mentioned that they are also ANC 
members, and even though they do not always agree with the various policies it proposes, 
they remain loyal to the party. As Mr. McKenzie from SADTU said they have been 
involved in "opposition politics" for too long (Interview, 2003) 
It is not only the political alliance of many of the trade unions in the public service that 
impedes on the ability of labour to negotiate with the government as a united front, but it 
is also the different political and ideological histories of the different unions that impact 
on the ability for unity and solidarity. Unions in the public service in South Africa can be 
divided in to two blocs. The first is comprised of the historically led staff associations, 
such as the PSA, and the second is comprised of the progressive unions, led by 
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NEHA WU (patel, 2000a: 131). The unions in the first bloc benefited from the apartheid 
system, as the government of the day catered solely for their members' needs. These are 
the mostly white staff associations formed in the apartheid era, whose members were 
mostly skilled professionals (e.g. PSA, HOSPERSA, and SAOU). These unions, 
therefore, view transformation of the public service through a different perspective from 
the unions who organize mostly black, non-professional public servants. The latter were 
sidelined and actively discriminated against in the apartheid era, and they stand the most 
to gain through democratic transformation of the public service. The unions in the latter 
bloc were at the forefront of the struggle to end apartheid, and they are the more militant 
and political unions (e.g. NEHA WU, SADTU). Patel (2000a: 175) says that this multi-
unionism is a barrier to the effective participation of labour as it renders workplace 
cooperation extremely difficult 
3.3 CONTEMPORARY EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND THE EXERCISE OF 
VOICE 
3.3.1 The structure of employee relations in the public service 
The contemporary South African public service employs just over a million employees, 
making the government the single largest employer in the country. The total numbers of 
public servants have declined since 1995, with 1.27 million employees in 1995 (patel, 
1997:188), and only 1.1 million public servants in 1998 (Baskin, 2000:153). The South 
African public service is regarded as one of the best educated in the developing world. 
However, the government is also the largest employer of elementary workers (Makgetla, 
2000:2). This shows the great extent of public sector employment, which is one of the 
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reasons why managing employee relations in this sector is so difficult. The large class 
divides because of the disparate professions within the public service (Makgetla, 2000:3), 
make negotiations and the creation of a uniform employee relations system in the public 
service a difficult task. 
With the passing of the 1995 LRA, public servants were brought under the same labour 
legislation as the private sector. Section 36 of the LRA of 1995 makes provision for the 
establishment of a central coordinating bargaining council, known as the Public Service 
Coordinating Bargaining Council (see Figure 1 for the structure of collective bargaining 
in the South African public service). Section 37 provides for the establishment of sectoral 
councils, either designated by the PSCBC or the President, in consultation with the 
PSCBC. The sectoral councils currently established are the Education Labour Relations 
Council, the Public Health and Welfare Sectoral Bargaining Council, the Safety and 
Security Sectoral Bargaining Council and the General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining 
Council. The term "sectoral councils" is very misleading. This is due to the fact that only 
the PHWSBC is truly sectoral, as it covers national and provincial departments of Health 
and Social services, and other health and welfare professionals working in other 
departments. The ELRC and the SSSBC are delineated along departmental lines, 
covering the teachers employed in terms of the Educators Employment Act, and South 
African police service and Department of Safety and Security, respectively. The 
GPSSBC covers all other public service employees who are not covered by another 
sectoral council (pSCBC Annual Report, 2002 and PSCBC Draft Annual Report, 2003). 
Mr. Gilbert of the PSA and Ms. Huluman of the PSCBC (Interviews, 2003) are of the 
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opinion that this creates confusion in the public service, as it is not always clear under 
which sectoral council an employee falls, and it creates disparate working conditions 
within the same workplace. 
Provincially, chambers have been established in the various sectors. However, not all the 
sectoral councils have established provincial chambers in all the provinces. The problem 
with establishing provincial chambers for the GPSSBC lies in the fact that the provincial 
chambers deal with issues that only affect a specific province and a specific employer. 
But as the GPSSBC covers a multitude of different departments, certain issues are not 
pertinent to certain departments, making it impossible t  discuss many issues 
provincially. The second reason why provincial chambers have been established for all 
the sectoral councils in all the provinces is due to the existence of the Western Cape 
Bargaining Council. This council came into being with the introduction of the LRA, 
which had a transitional arrangement that all provincial chambers established in terms of 
'the PSLRA will become fully-fledged bargaining councils. The PSCBC attempted to 
deregister all the departmental and provincial councils established under the PSLRA, but 
the WCBC and several unions disputed this move and took the PSCBC to court. The 
WCBC won the case. This has resulted in two resolutions awaiting approval at the 
PSCBC. The first aims to give the PSCBC the legal authority to deregister any council 
within the scope of the PSCBC, and the second revolves around the establishment of a 
provincial coordinating bargaining council, which is intended to cover all public servants 
within a specific province, and deal with issues that are transverse within that province. 
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The PSCBC deals with issues that are transverse in the public service, whilst the sectoral 
councils deal with issues pertaining just to that specific sector, and provincial chambers 
deal with issues affecting only that specific province and that specific employer. As each 
sector has its own specific needs and interests, resolutions reached at the PSCBC need to 
accommodate these interests and needs. This is done by concluding framework 
agreements, the details of which have to be worked out at the sectoral level. Decisions 
reached at the PSCBC are binding on the sectors, but the sectoral councils cannot bind 
the PSCBC, although they may make recommendations to the PSCBC. The parties 
represented at sectoral level are also represented at the PSCBC. 
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Figure 1: Intended structW'e of bargaining councils in the public service 
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The conventional model of public sector control is the bureaucracy, where managerial 
power derives from a distinct hierarchy of authority that is set in legislation. 
Organizational hierarchies, standardized work processes and the unilateral central 
determination of tenns and conditions of employment characterize employment practices. 
The extension of labour legislation to South African public servants therefore had to be 
done in a way to accommodate this high degree of centralization and to adhere to the 
concept that the employer is one body (Adair & Albertyn. 2000:814+816). Therefore, the 
PSCBC was designated as the main bargaining forum for the public service, with the 
other councils subordinate to it. This appears to go counter to international trends of 
decentralizing bargaining in the wake of neo-liberal debates regarding what services the 
government should provide and alternate means of organizing the public service. 
However, public service transformation in South Africa has attempted to decentralize 
bargaining and to devolve power downward through the creation of the sectoral councils 
and the provincial chambers (Adair & Albertyn, 2000:819-820). Changes in the power of 
provincial chambers have occurred, as initially they had no authority to make binding 
decisions, yet now they do. However, the attempt at decentralizing bargaining has not 
rationalized the bargaining process; rather it has led to greater fragmentation in the 
bargaining process. The first reason for this is that due to the fact that sectoral councils 
are delineated along departmental and not sectoral lines, the same workplace may be 
covered by more than one council, which leads to disparate terms and conditions of 
employment in the same workplace, and uncertainty regarding which bargaining council 
covers which employee. The second reason for this that decentralization has not been 
done with a concomitant decentralization of managerial power. Local managers have 
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only been empowered to decide on human resources management issues (Adair & 
Albe~ 20oo:822). This state of affairs does not foster accountability or responsibility 
of management, and it also means that employees and trade unions can only participate 
meaningfully at the highest and most central level (Adler, 2000:35). 
The employee relations system post-1994 in the South African public service can best be 
described as "Pluralistic", where it is accepted that the different stakeholders have 
different interests from one another, and that these interests and objectives must be 
maintained in equilibrium. Employee relations become more complex from this 
perspective, as there are several loci of authority and loyalty, and each actor only holds 
partial allegiance to the ruling actor (Fox, 1969:398). From this perspective, unions play 
an important social role as they ensure that individual rights of freedom of association 
and the right to combine and exercise their voice is maintained, and combining 
collectively is seen as reducing the imbalance of power between the parties (Fox, 
1969:393+397+140). Public servants have been given legal freedom of association, and 
the positive right to engage with the state in setting their terms and conditions of 
employment This is an indication of the fonnal recognition of the differing interests 
between the employer and employees, and an apparent acknowledgement that collective 
bargaining is the best way of dealing with this conflict, and maintaining equilibrium in 
the system. 
The LRA of 1995 also has elements of corporatism in it, most notably societal 
corporatism. In societal corporatism great efforts are expended to ensure consensus and 
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agreement to ensure stability in employee relations and in society at large, as all role 
players are involved in decision making (Swanepoel, 1999: 10). Societal corporatism is 
based on the concept of democracy, and the relationship between the actors is 
institutionalized through tripartite structures. Conflict is seen as natural, and it is dealt 
with through centralized negotiations (Finnemore, 1999:12). Tripartite structures have 
been developed in South Africa, with the intention that the relevant stakeholders should 
be able to have a say in the development of policy and laws in the country. These will be 
discussed further in the section dealing with the exercise of voice by public service trade 
unions. 
It is important to note that the employee relations perspective identifiable from the 
perspective of the employer (in this case the government), does not always parallel the 
perspective of the employees. In fact, many trade unions within the public service in 
South Africa appear to operate from a "Radical/Conflict perspective". This perspective is 
concerned with the distribution of power within the employee relations system, and is 
premised on the fact that there is a large disparity in power between the employer and the 
employees. Trade unions are seen as pivotal in attempting to balance this power, but this 
balance is never completely restored as the employer is always more powerful. Trade 
unions only mitigate the situation by enabling employees to challenge the employer on 
certain issues, but management is never challenged on the basic principles of the social 
and industrial life, such as private property, division oflabour, etc. (Fox, 1977:141, 142-
144). Collective bargaining is seen as an attempt by the employer to co-opt trade unions 
into the capitalist frame of reference, and it is seen as a fayade, where management still 
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dictates the terms of engagement (Fox, 1977: 144-145 and Swanepoel, 1999:9). Several of 
the interviewees noted that the government as employer is always put at a greater 
advantage in negotiations due to its dual role as the state. They state that collective 
bargaining is a farce, as the government decides the budget for increases before 
negotiations start, and they do not move above that position. It was also noted that the 
government as employer does not hold the interests of employees at heart, but rather that 
is guided by its macro-economic principles and its own transformative agenda. And 
because the government is also the state, it has the power to unilaterally implement its 
policies without having to negotiate with the unions. 
3.3.2 The exercise of voiee in the publie serviee 
Until 1993, public servants were not entitled to any form of collective bargaining, or any 
form of effective participation in the setting of terms and conditions of employment The 
PSLRA of 1993 legislated collective bargaining for public servants, and this was the first 
time a formal channel for the exercise of voice by public servants was created. However, 
legislating a matter and implementing it are two separate issues, as the implementation is 
a much more complex task. As the terms and conditions of employment of public 
servants had been centrally determined up until that time, the employers negotiating team 
had no previous experience in bargaining, and they had no training in the matter either 
(Makget1a, 2ooo:3). Also, the negotiating parties did not have a history of engagement 
with one another, so norms of engagement had to be established. Another problem with 
negotiations between the state and labour in the public service is the existence of various 
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unions in the bargaining council, all with very different historical and ideological 
backgrounds. 
As mentioned earlier, until the passing of the PSLRA of 1993, public servants were not 
permitted to form or join trade unions, nor were they legally permitted to go on strike. 
Despite this, between 1989 and 1993 the three biggest public sector unions (NEHA WU, 
SADro and POPCRU) went on a wave of strikes, which eventually culminated in a new 
labour dispensation for public servants and the passing of the 1993 PSLRA, which saw 
core rights being extended to public servants for the :first time (Adler, 2000: 11 and 
Macun and Psoulis, 2000:99). 
Even after the implementation of bargaining councils in the public service, the unions 
have continued to use strike action as a means of exercising their voice when they are in 
dispute with the government over wages and other terms and conditions of employment. 
For example, public service workers went on strike in 1998 due to a wage dispute. An 
agreement was never reached in this instance, as the government just unilaterally 
implemented its offer in September of that year (Adler, 2000:27). 
Public service workers once again went on strike in September 2004, due to a wage 
dispute. At the time the strike began, the government offer was 6%, but the unions 
demanded 7% (Macmillan, 2004).800000 public servants went on strike on Thursday 16 
September 2004 (Burger & Mapaza, 2004), including nurses, teachers, municipal 
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workers, police, immigration officials and police warders (Carstens, 2004). When the 
Minister of Public Service and Administration, Geraldine Fraser Molekti, attempted to 
address the strikers in Pretoria, she was booed off the platform, amidst bottles, cans and 
fruit being flung at her (Burger & Mapaza, 2004). A crisis meeting was called by the 
PSCBC for Friday 17 September 2004, at which the parties were to attempt to reach an 
agreement, especially considering that several unions had threatened that they would 
continue the strike on the following Monday and Tuesday if the government did not 
revise their offer (Burger & Mapaza, 2004). At the crisis talk, the government offered a 
new deal of a further 1 % increase over the next two years of the agreement (i.e. 0.5% in 
2005 and 0.5% in 2006) (Seep, 2004). The agreement was eventually signed on 29 
September 2004, which granted a 6.2% across the board increase and an increase of the 
CPIX plus 0.4% for the following two years. The government also committed RSOO 
million to addressing the backlog of salary scales in education (Burger, 2004). 
Hirschman (1970) uses the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty to describe the options that 
consumers of a service or employees have in responding to a drop in service delivery or 
conditions of employment. According to Hirschman (1970:24+32), exit and voice are 
both effective means of alerting management to the deteriorated state of affairs, provided 
that they occur within certain bounds, to allow management the time and opportunity to 
get things back on track. The option chosen depends on the relative costs involved, and a 
consideration of which option may result in a success. In the South African public 
service, employees have legally been given two avenues for the exercise of voice. The 
first is through legislated collective bargaining, and the second is through being given the 
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legal right to strike, albeit with certain reservations (e.g. essential service not being 
allowed to strike). Trade unions in the South African public service are in a good position 
to exercise the voice option. The first reason for this is that through the 
ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance, labour potentially has a direct link to government, which 
it can lobby in times when it is felt that the employer is acting in a way which 
disadvantages the employees. The second reason for this is that the unions in the South 
African public service have a relatively long history of engagement with the state as 
employer (about 10 years), and they have an even longer history of organizing and 
mobilizing employees. One could speculate that a major contributing factor to the 
exercise of voice, rather than exit, at a time of dispute, is that in a country with such large 
unemployment, exit is not a viable option. Exercising the voice option is by no means a 
"cheap" option, as strikers are not paid for the day they are on strike, and before the 2004 
strike, it was estimated that the strike would cost the unions close to R2 million to hire 
busses, have posters and advertisements made, etc. (Macmillan, 2004). The use of the 
voice option in terms of strike action is not a straight forward issue in the public service, 
as the interviewees indicated that it is not always easy to get the support of the public for 
public service strikes, as they are the ones most adversely impacted on by the strike. The 
union representatives all said that their demands are always played up against the 
demands of the public for increased service delivery. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the LRA of 1995 contains corporatist elements in 
that it espouses broad participation in policy formulation. One of the forums on which 
trade unions may have a say in policy formulation is Nedlac, at which all policy 
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proposals are discussed before being passed through parliament. Mr. Z, a DPSA 
representative, stated that when it comes to policy formulation, the employer party 
always takes the lead, especially with regards to technical matters as the unions do not 
have the capacity to engage on these matters (Interview, 2004). Mr. X, also a DPSA 
representative, added that it is due to capacity constraints that the unions prefer to engage 
on a central level, as they do not have enough resources to participate at the local level 
(Interview, 2004). Mr. Maitatsane from NUPSAW also said that the unions prefer 
centralized negotiations due to capacity constraints (Interview, 2003). Several 
interviewees commented on the fact that the avenues for consultation are in place, but 
that the government does not always follow the correct channels when implementing a 
proposal. The interviewees state that the government is not always forthcoming with 
information, and the first time the unions hear about a matter is when it is already at 
parliament. They say that this means that participation is not always meaningful, as the 
impact they as labour can have at such a late stage is merely to attempt to limit the 
damage to their members, without being able to really influence the outcome. 
The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is an attempt to make the budgetary 
process more responsive to the interests of labour. It is a three year projection of the 
government's budget, and it includes mechanisms for the participation of the public in the 
formulation of the budget. Participation is only of a very limited nature, as the state 
maintains executive authority (Adler, 2000:31). Adler (2000:31) states that labour's 
participation on the MTEF is problematic for the unions, as effective participation 
requires that the unions formulate an initial negotiating position a year in advance, and 
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that the unions must develop their economic research capacity and their capacity to 
engage with the government in an effective and sophisticated manner. At the 2001 Public 
Service Job Summit a framework agreement was reached which was intended to improve 
participation in the budgetary process. The government, as employer, agreed to the 
following: use of existing structures and processes to engage on the budget, including 
Nedlac; full and open discussion of proposals that effect employees; a budgeting process 
that is more sensitive to employment; and scheduling that PSCBC bargaining takes place 
at a time in the MTEF cycle where it can impact on the drafting of the budget (pSCBC 
Annual Report, 2001). 
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SECTION 4: COUNTRY REPORT - NAMIBIA 
4.1 mSTORY OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN NAMIBIA AND THE 
NANUBLlNPUBLICSERVICE 
What is known as Namibia today was declared a Gennan Protectorate in 1884, and was 
called German South West Africa. In the late 1890's and early 1900's there were tribal 
rebellions against the Germans, but due to the superior military power of the Germans, 
these rebellions were soon quashed, and virtually all tribal lands were confiscated, pass 
laws enforced, tribal chieftainships prohibited, ownership of large amounts of livestock 
forbidden and Africans forced into labour (van Rooyen, 1996:4). Gennan colonizers had 
put in a system of migrant labour and exploitation in Namibia by as early as the 1900's. 
The Germans needed a highly controlled and docile labour force in order to work on 
mines, settler farms and to build the transport infrastructure. At that time, the Germans 
declared two thirds of the country as a "Police Zone", which meant that black people 
from the "Native Reserve" could only enter it with a special pennit, similar to the South 
African pass laws (Bauer, 1997:55). 
After the First World War, South West Africa was put under the tutelage of the Union of 
South Africa, which meant that South Africa had full legal authority over the territory 
(van Rooyen, 1996:5). Up to independence in 1990, Namibia was treated as a subsidiary 
of South Africa, with the same repressive and racist system of rules present as in South 
Africa. From the 1950's racism became institutionalized through the consolidation of 
apartheid capitalism in Namibia. Black people were exploited economically and socially 
through the system of apartheid political control (Klerck, Murray & Sycholt, 1997:8, 
49 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
5:6). Black employees, in general, were not permitted to form or join trade unions. Under 
South African rule, black employee relations were regulated mainly by the Masters and 
Servants Proclamation of 1916, which was repealed by the Masters and Servants Act of 
1918, which was repealed by the Masters and Servants Proclamation of 1920. To a large 
degree the Proclamation mimicked labour relations under German rule, but it removed 
acts of physical punishment as legally permissible in cases of transgressions. Without 
making specific mention of trade unions the 1920 Proclamation made employees guilty 
of an offence for various matters relating to trade unionism. The 1920 Proclamation was 
also the first attempt at regulating collective employee relations by, for example, allowing 
consultations with the view of concluding a collective agreement (van Rooyen, 1996: 133-
137). Other than the Masters and Servants Proclamation, several other proclamations and 
ordinances were passed which were aimed at regulating the economic and social life of 
black people in Namibia (van Rooyen, 1996:137-141). 
From 1952 until 1992 all employees in Namibia (except farm workers, domestic workers 
and public servants), were covered by the Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance 
of 1952. The 1952 Ordinance made provision for the establishment of trade unions. 
However, black workers were excluded from the sections pertaining to trade unions, 
dispute resolution and strikes (Bauer, 1997:68 and van Rooyen, 1996:154). It was only 
from 1978 that black workers were able to legally organize themselves, even though it 
was only in the mid-1980's that actual unions emerged to represent black workers (Bauer, 
1997:73 and van Rooyen, 1996:154). As such, labour relations in Namibia had a dualistic 
character, with better terms and conditions of employment for white employees. 
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Despite early efforts to organize workers in Namibia in the early to mid-1900's, it was 
only in the mid-1980's, with the establishment of the National Union of Namibian 
Workers by SWAPO activists and combatants imprisoned on Robben Island, that real 
organisation of Namibian workers started (Bauer, 1998:72, Bauer, 1997:61). In 1959 the 
Ovamboland People's Organisation was established, which was meant to address the 
concerns of African workers. However, it was transformed into the South West Africa 
People's Organisation (SWAPO) in 1960, which was no longer a worker movement, but 
a nationalist movement aimed at political liberation (Bauer, 1997:61, van Rooyen, 
1996:6). 
Up until the passing of the Labour Act of 1992, public servants were excluded from all 
labour legislation. lIDs meant that public servants were not permitted to be organised, 
participate in the setting of terms and conditions of employment, or legally participate in 
industrial action. The literature is very quiet on public sector employee relations in 
Namibia prior to independence. One can make the assumption, however, that the practice 
of employee relations in the Namibian public service mimicked to a large extent the 
practice of employee relations in the South African public service. lIDs would mean that 
terms and conditions of employment were centrally determined, without any form of 
employee participation being allowed. As in South Africa in the time before 
independence, the dominant employee relations perspective identifiable is the Unitarist 
perspective. 
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4.2 THE UNIQUE NATURE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE 
4.2.1 The dual role of the state as employer and the government 
The democratically elected SW APO government had made commitments to ex-
combatants who bad fought during the liberation struggle. After independence, these ex-
combatants have flooded in to the country, seeking employment. The Cabinet of Namibia 
decided to offer these people jobs in government. Many Ministries have refused to create 
additional positions for ex-combatants, but others have employed many ex-combatants (J 
Brandt, Interview, 2004). This is an example how the state uses this dual role to further 
its own political goals. 
Another way in which the state uses its dual role of employer and government in dealing 
with public service employees is through the political alliance. The government is 
reluctant to consult with the non-politically aligned unions, as it does not have the same 
sort of political control and influence over them as it does over the politically affiliated 
unions. In terms of the Labour Act of 1992, and employer does not have to engage in any 
form of consultation with a union that has not applied for recognition as an exclusive 
bargaining agent, which a union can only do if it has majority membership. In the mid-
1990s there was a dispute between NAPWU and the PSUN regarding who bad majority 
representation. A ballot was held, where it was decided that NAPWU bad the majority. 
Several commentators, as well as Mr. Jatamunua from the PSUN, said that the result of 
this ballot was not accurate, as several employees are members of both the PSUN and 
NAPWU. Mr. Jatamunua added that the ballot was very politicized, and the SW APO 
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party drew on the sympathies of loyal SW APO followers to become members of 
NAPWU. This was done so that the government could ensure that it would negotiate with 
its political ally (Interview, 2005). 
4.2.2 Political influences 
The labour movement in Namibia remains weak. The main reason for this is that the 
labour movement was established as part of an externally based nationalist movement, 
without any indigenous, grassroots worker identity. In most other African countries, the 
union movement spawned the broader political movement. But in Namibia, SW APO was 
the main driving force behind the establishment of the union movement within the 
NUNW group of unions. The labour movement in Namibia fell within the broader 
liberation struggle led by SW APO, and in many instances the struggle of labour was 
subordinate to the broader political struggle (Bauer, 1997:61&71). The grievances of 
workers were used by the trade unionists and the nationalist movement to mobilize the 
population to further the interests of the liberation movement (Bauer, 1998:81). Indeed, 
the difference between the political party and the trade union has been blurred since the 
inception of the NUNW. For example, many workers channeled their grievances through 
the SW APO office (Bauer, 1998:76), and SW APO has also tasked the unions with 
mobilizing workers during SWAPO electoral campaigns (Bauer, 1998:9). In the 1992 
local and regional elections, the NUNW general secretary pledged that all NUNW 
affiliated union members would vote SWAPO (Bauer, 1998:113).This has made these 
unions reluctant to work independently of SW APO, and has made SW APO reluctant to 
encourage a strong and independent labour movement (Bauer, 1998:94). In the 1980's 
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there were efforts to link the liberation struggle to the struggle against capitalist 
exploitation, but the predominant ideology of SW APO remained that of national 
liberation. There was only a very limited class consciousness amongst union members 
and leaders alike, which allowed SW APO to introduce a capitalist order without much 
resistance from labour (Jauch, 2002:31). 
Prior to independence, the SW APO party's electoral campaign put the interests of 
workers at the top of SW APO' s agenda, stating that a new labour dispensation was their 
first priority (Bauer, 1998:74). However, these socialist ideals were left behind soon after 
the new government came into power. Although the conditions for organized workers 
have improved considerably with the passing of the Labour Act of 1992, the government 
has been hard pressed to balance the interests of workers and the (mostly white) wealth 
generating capitalist class. The government has attempted to promote peace and stability 
in order to attract foreign investment. To some extent this has been done by keeping a 
close rein on the NUNW affiliated unions through, for example, taking union leaders into 
government positions and actively discouraging disaffiliation (Bauer, 1998:9&117 and 
Murray & Wood, 1997:191). Despite the fact that many of the policies of the new 
government are not "labour friendly", and the fact that there still exists a high degree of 
socio-economic inequality in Namibia, most of the NUNW affiliated unions still have a 
high level of emotional attachm~t to SW APO, who they see as the "mother of 
independence" (Jauch, 2002:31), and they continue to argue that it is only through 
continued affiliation with SW APO that they stand any chance of achieving the reforms 
they are striving for (Jauch, 2002:32). 
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This close link between the NUNW and SW APO has not only created conflict between 
NUNW unions and the non-politically aligned unions, but it has also caused conflict 
within the NUNW, and between the NUNW and SWAPO. Several people within the 
NUNW have opposed the continued affiliation with SW APO, stating that affiliation 
hampers the unions from developing their own identity and this prevents them from 
effectively serving the needs of their members (Murray & Wood, 1997:189). In addition, 
the political link discourages non-SW APO supporters from joining NUNW affiliated 
unions (Bauer, 1998:110 and Murray & Wood, 1997:190). Those favouring affiliation 
state that it is of strategic importance to the NUNW as it ensures that the federation is 
able to have an impact on decision-making. But in reality, NUNW delegates on the 
SW APO Central Committee are in the minority and do not really have much impact. The 
pro-affiliation bloc also argues that disaffiliation would lead to greater fragmentation in 
the labour movement (Murray & Wood, 1997:191). Mr. Simataa, from the PSC, is of the 
opinion that the affiliation has contributed to sound labour relations in Namibia. He does, 
however, concede that this may be due to the fact that unions are stifled by the affiliation 
(Interview, 2004). 
4.3 CONTEMPORARY EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND THE EXERCISE OF 
VOICE 
4.3.1 The structure of employee relations in the public service 
The Public Service Act 13 of 1995 does not expressly define what the public service is, 
other than stating in Section 3(1) that for the purposes of administration, the public 
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service is divided into Offices, Ministries and Agencies, and then listing these in 
schedules 1 to 3 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act states "the Public Service shall consist of 
all such persons as may be employed permanently or temporarily on a fUll-time or part-
time basis or under a special contract or under any contract of employment contemplated 
in S34(l)(a)". Section 34 (1)(a) deals with the Prime Minister regulating employment 
conditions, including contracts of employment. 
At independence, the Namibian public service had 46 651 posts, of which 42 562 were 
filled in March 1990. As in South Africa, the public service was fragmented along racial 
and ethnic lines, which necessitated immediate restructuring. lbis meant the immediate 
creation of 15 000 posts and thousands more over the following years. A major reason 
why the public service swelled so much immediately after independence is because prior 
to independence, Namibia did not have its own police force or military. This was dealt 
with by South Africa (Interview, Mr. Brandt, 2004) In 1991, the public service had 67 
000 posts, and in 1995 there were 73 000 posts (Ministry of Labour, June 1997:48). In 
2004, the public service employed 76 373 people, of which 28921 were employed in the 
police service (11 839), the military (15 276), political office bearers and other office 
bearers (261), and the electoral commission (19). This means that in 2004, there were 47 
452 public servants (Public Service Commission of Namibia Annual Report, 2003:47). 
This has lead to the perception that the Namibian public service is bloated and oversized 
(Sycholt & Klerck, 1997:109). Despite the growth in the public service, standards of 
service delivery have fallen. Mr. Brandt from the Public Service Commission attributes 
this to the fact that management in the public service does not look at productivity. He 
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said that their solution to a service delivery problem up until this point has just been to 
appoint additional people (Interview, 2004). 
The National Development Plan 1 suggested that the government should re-look its role 
and function as a basic service provider, and allow the private sector to playa larger role 
in service delivery. These suggestions were reiterated in the Wages and Salaries 
Commission (WASCOM) report of 1995, which further recommended the 
commercialization of certain services (e.g. Namwater, Airports Company, Namibia 
Wildlife Resorts), and the report recommended the privatization of certain parastatals. 
The report went further to recommend the contracting out of cleaning, security and 
gardening. The report did not receive immediate attention, but the Efficiency and Charter 
Unit was established, with the mandate to develop an outsourcing policy and to 
implement WASCOM's recommendations. As such, the Efficiency and Charter Unit 
embarked on an exercise to scrutinize all OfficeslMinistriesl Agencies, by tasking them to 
divide themselves into core and non-core functions (Labour and Research Institute, 
2000:32-34). Although there was a freeze on all new appointments in the public service 
since 1992, this was not effective in streamlining the public service. Generally, the Public 
Service Commission must approve all new appointments, but this does not apply to entry-
level positions. This has led to an increase in employment of the general and admin 
positions, with a continual lack of skilled professionals (Ministry of Labour, June 
1997:49). 
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The Labour Act of 1992 has legislated collective bargaining for all sectors in Namibia, 
including the public service. A union may apply for recognition as an "exclusive 
bargaining agenf' if it has the majority membership in that sector. What recognition 
means is that the union is entitled to engage in collective bargaining with the employer 
(Corbet, 1995: (A)N3). In principle, the same applies to the public service. However, the 
actual practice of collective bargaining in the public service is more difficult than in the 
private sector. The problem with collective bargaining and employee relations in general, 
in the public service in Namibia is that the Prime Minister, through the Public Service 
Act of 1995, maintains a lot of power to unilaterally decide on various terms and 
conditions of employment for public servants. Another problem is that bargaining units in 
the public service are poorly defined, and it is not clear who should fall within the 
bargaining unit. The details of the ability of unions to exercise voice will be discussed in 
the next section. 
The rhetoric behind employee relations in the public service of Namibia, in terms of the 
Labour Act of 1992, can be construed to fall within the "Pluralist" perspective of 
employee relations, as there is the institutionalized recognition that there is a conflict of 
interest between employers and employees and collective bargaining has been legislated 
in an attempt to regulate this conflict. However, the actual practice of employee relations 
in the public service follows more Unitarist lines, as the underlying assumption of the 
Public Service Act of 1995 is that the Prime Minister, as the employer of the public 
service, has the right to, and is able to decide on various matters affecting the 
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employment of public servants. As such, employee relations in the Namibian public 
service has maintained a very centralized character. 
Discussing employee relations in Namibia is in many respects inseparable from 
discussing the issue of the political affiliation between the NUNW and SW APO. The 
details of this affiliation has already been discussed in the previous section. For current 
purposes, it is sufficient to state that SW APO uses this political alliance to subdue the 
labour movement, and often comes out in direct criticism of unions. For example, newly 
elected President Pohamba came out strongly against unions in his May Day speeches in 
2005, criticizing unions for their stance towards business, and calling for greater 
productivity. As such, Namibia shows characteristics of state corporatism in its approach 
to employee relations. Finnemore (1999: 15) states that state corporatism is common in 
developing countries where the labour movements played a pivotal role in the liberation 
struggle, but are expected to merge their interests with the ruling party after 
independence. This is indeed the case in Namibia, where the government has attempted 
to keep a tight rein on labour through the continued political affiliation between the 
NUNW and SW APO. SW APO has actively discouraged disaffiliation, and has called on 
workers and unions to support the development policies of the government However, up 
until this point the more extreme elements of state corporatism (e.g. harassment and 
incarceration of trade union leaders) have not been present in Namibia (Sycholdt & 
Klerck, 1997:100). 
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4.3.2 The exercise of voice in the public service 
The Labour Act of 1992 brought public servants under the same legislation as private 
sector employees, excluding the police and defense forces (Corbet, 1995: (A)Nl and 
Sycholt & Klerck, 1997:109). It was only then that public sector workers could join trade 
unions (Murray and Wood, 1997:169). Four unions organize public sector employees: 
Public Service Union of Namibia (pSUN), Namibia Public Workers Union (NAPWU), 
Namibian National Teachers Union (NANTU) and Teachers Union of Namibia (TUN). 
NAPWU was established in 1987, and is affiliated to the NVNW. The PSUN grew out of 
the Government Service Staff Association, which was established in 1981. NAPWU has 
the majority in the public service, which means that it is eligible for collective bargaining 
rights (Murray & Wood, 1997:173). NANTU and TUN represent teachers. NANTU was 
established as an alternative to the National Teachers Federation, at a time when many 
teachers felt that the NTF was collaborating with the apartheid state. The NTF consisted 
of various ethnically defined associations to which all teachers were obliged to belong. 
NANTU was established in 1989 from several associations breaking away from the NTF. 
The TUN was established in 1990 from the associations that did not dissolve before 
independence. NANTU holds the majority in the teaching profession and has concluded a 
recognition agreement with the Office of the Prime Minister (Murray & Wood, 
1997:173-174). 
The Labour Act of 1992 and the Public Service Act of 1995 regulate collective 
bargaining in the public service. In terms of the Labour Act of 1992, a registered union is 
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eligible for recognition as an "exclusive bargaining agent" and hence be entitled to enter 
into collective bargaining agreements (Corbet, 1995: (A)N3). Despite this, few unions in 
the public service have applied for recognition as an "exclusive bargaining agent", and 
the government has retained unilateral control over a number of key issues. The agenda 
for collective bargaining in the public service in Namibia is severely restricted by Section 
5 of the Public Service Act. This section gives the Prime Minister the power to 
unilaterally decide on a wide range of issues (Murray, Sycholt & Kampungu, 
1997:146&162). Collective bargaining is further hampered by the fact that there is no 
clear distinction between employers and employees in the public service. This has 
repercussions for how bargaining units are defined and who should be negotiated for 
(Sycholt & Klerck, 1997:112-113). Mr. Simataa, a member of the employer's negotiating 
team said that the bargaining unit is not well defined, and this has led to the fact that 
ministers, politicians and management are also being negotiated for. He said that 
government officials on the government's negotiating team cannot negotiate for 
themselves, and that is why management should be removed from the bargaining unit 
(Interview, 2004) 
The recognition agreement between the government as the employer and NAPWU 
regulates the bargaining relationship. The bargaining unit is defined as "the Public 
Service staff members excluding those in the bargaining unit of NANTU, members of the 
National Security Intelligence Agency as well as members of the services as defined in 
the Labour Act of 1992 ". The scope of what may be negotiated on is quite extensive, as 
per the recognition agreement, including such matters as rates of pay, procedures for 
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promotions, transfers and discharges, housing, leave and leave pay, hours of work, etc. 
(Recognition Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) 
and the Namibia Public Workers Union (NAPWU), signed in July 1997). Negotiations 
between NAPWU and the government occur annually, but the previous agreement 
reached covered a 3 year period, and the next negotiations are to only occur in 2006 
(Simataa, Interview 2004). Mr. Simataa said that the fact that the array of topics that may 
be negotiated about is so extensive, it means that the employer cannot "do anything" 
without the involvement of the union. He continued to say that the union is unreasonable 
at times, and makes an issue out of everything, even when the proposal would actually 
benefit the employees (Interview, 2004). 
As mentioned earlier, it is only NAPWU that negotiates with the employer regarding 
terms and conditions of employment, as it is the only union (aside from NANTU) that has 
applied for recognition as an exclusive bargaining agent. Mr. Jatamunua from the PSUN 
stated that due to the "competitive atmosphere" between the unions prevents them from 
acting as a united front during negotiations with the employer. He said that ideally 
NAPWU and the PSUN would consult with one another prior to negotiations to ensure 
that interest of all public servants are catered for. He added that the PSUN has suggested 
that a negotiating chamber be developed, where labours representation is based on its 
membership weight. He said that this proposal was turned down. The reason for this, 
according to Mr. Jatamunua, is that the government does not want to negotiate with a 
non-politically aligned union. He said that the alliance between NAPWU and the 
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SW APO party means that both parties are reluctant to bring in outsiders (Interview, 
2(05). 
Mr. Jatamunua said that outside of the annual negotiations between the government and 
NAPWU, the PSUN can approach the government or a specific department to discuss 
certain conditions of employment of its members. He cited the example of a recent issue 
of overtime for prison workers. He added, however, that the government seldomly 
concedes to these matters during consultation, as he thinks the government does not want 
to be seen to have "given in to" the "opposition". As such, these sorts of matters always 
end up in the Labour Court, which is a very expensive and time-consuming way of 
dealing with disputes (Interview, 2(05). 
The first time trade unions in Namibia were able to participate with the government on 
policy formulation was in 1987 in the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Matters, 
headed by Professor Wiehahn (Murray & Wood, 1997:193). This enquiry led to the 
eventual drafting of the Labour Act of 1992. The new SW APO led government has 
committed itself to social partnership by establishing various tripartite structures through 
the Labour Act of 1992 (Murray & Wood, 1997:194 and Bauer, 1998:107). One of these 
structures is the Labour Advisory Council, which advises the Minister on various matters 
pertaining to labour. The NUNW, however, has criticized the fact that only two of the 
four labour seats have been given to the NUNW, reserving the other two for ''minority 
unions" (Murray & Wood, 1997:194 and Murray, Sycholt & Kampungu, 1997:173), as 
well as criticizing the fact that the LAC is merely an advisory body, with the Minister or 
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Cabinet still being able to make the final decision (Murray & Wood, 1997;194). Mr. 
Jatamunua from the PSUN stated important legislative matters are discussed at the LAC, 
and he is of the opinion that labour actually does have an influence of policies that are 
discussed at the LAC. He added that the government also consults unions individually on 
various policy issues that may have an impact on the members of the union (Interview, 
2004). 
The establishment of a wages commission is another tripartite s1ructure developed by the 
Labour Act of 1992, where a representative from a registered trade union and a registered 
employer's organisation in the affected sector may make submissions to the commission 
regarding wages in a particular sector. However, with the establishment of WASCOM. in 
the public sector, no union representatives were involved (Murray & Wood, 1997:196-
195). 
Tripartite s1ructures in Namibia have been formed at the initiative of the government, 
which makes the government able to determine the form of participation on these 
structures (Sycholdt & Klerek, 1997:98 and Jauch, 2002:32). Despite the rhetoric 
espoused by the government regarding participation, labour is often times marginalized, 
especially with regards to issues pertaining to macro-economic planning and socio,;" 
economic restructuring (Murray & Wood, 1997;195 and Murray, Sycholdt and 
Kampungu, 1997;175). 
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It is not only the fact that the government often marginalizes unions that impedes the 
ability of unions to participate effectively at the various tripartite structures, but it is also 
internal union capacity problems that hinder participation. The unions only have a very 
rudimentary research capacity (Bauer, 1998: 117). In order to be able to participate 
effectively, the unions will have to develop their capacity to research socio-economic 
policy issues, as well as to educate union leaders on social, economic, and political issues 
(Jauch, 2002:35). The unions are also faced with serious problems in their leadership, as 
many of the most experienced leaders have taken up positions in government or the 
private sector. The Namibian unions are also not financially self reliant, as they continue 
to rely on foreign donors (Bauer, 1998:117-118). 
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SECTION 5: COUNTRY REPORT - BOTSWANA 
5.1 mSTORY OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN BOTSWANA AND THE 
BOTSWANA PUBLIC SERVICE 
Botswana, or the Bechuanaland Protectorate, became a British protectorate in September 
1885 (picard, 1987:27 and Samatar, 1999:43). At the time of Britain declaring a formal 
protectorate over the area, there were no plans of the territory ever becoming an 
independent state. Rather, the plan was to incorporate Bechuanaland into South Africa 
(picard, 1987:47 and Samatar, 1999:44). This was especially so as the country was seen 
as not holding much mineral wealth to exploit (Dale, 1995:127). As such, very few 
imperial resources were allocated to the Protectorate (Dale, 1995:133), which led to a 
dearth of social welfare problems in the country. For example, until 1964 the school 
curriculum followed the South African separatist system. For black scholars, schooling 
was limited to primary school. A curriculum for South African university matric was only 
introduced in 1954, and the first government secondary school was only built in 1965. 
Prior to 1965, there were 2 protectorate schools where black students could obtain a post-
junior certificate, but aside from that, students had to attend high school in South Africa, 
but few could afford it Tertiary education was limited to UNISA until the establishment 
of the University of Botswana in 1981 (Dale, 1995 :66). In 1960, only 8 Batswana were 
university students, and in that year there were no Batswana matriculants. By 1970, there 
was only about 165 Batswana matriculating per year. This lack of an educational 
infrastructure meant that Botswana was heavily reliant on outsiders for skilled workers, 
such as lawyers, doctors, nurses, etc. (Dale, 1995:66+70-74 and Picard, 1987:85). This 
problem persisted after independence, which led the government to send many students 
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outside the region for specialized training, as well as offering very attractive packages to 
foreign experts (Dale, 1995:74-78). Specifically within the public service, the majority of 
jobs were held by expatriates at independence, a situation which remained unchanged for 
many years. Many countries affiliated with the UN assisted in training Batswana public 
servants (Dale, 1995:95). 
Prior to independence, Botswana received aid from South Africa, probably due to the fact 
that Botswana was to be transferred to South Africa (Dale, 1995:134). When talks of 
Botswana becoming independent started, South Africa withdrew aid, and Britain finally 
started developing the Botswana infrastructure and economic planning was 
institutionalized (Dale, 1995: 134 and Picard, 1987:98). After independence, Botswana 
became reliant on foreign aid donors, such as Sweden, Germany and the United States, 
who, in turn, were attracted to Botswana due to its fine planning and fiscal probity and its 
democratic, multi-party, non-racial government (Dale, 1995:135). 
From as early as 1844 Botswana was exporting unskilled labour to South African mines, 
farms and industry (picard, 1987:27 and Dale, 1995:139), whilst having to import skilled 
labour from South Africa. In 1886, 28244 Batswana were working in South Africa. The 
reason for this is that Botswana mining was too small to create enough jobs, and 
Botswana's manufacturing sector had also been very small (Dale, 1995: 139-140). It 
became virtually essential for Batswana men to migrate to find employment in 1899 with 
the imposition of the Hut Tax (Dale, 1995:143 and Picard, 1987:111). As mentioned 
earlier, Britain did not want to invest money in Botswana due to the plans to transfer it to 
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South Africa However, the chiefs in Botswana did not want the transfer to occur, so they 
petitioned Britain to not transfer Botswana, which led to Britain putting the issue of 
transfer on hold. In return for this, the chiefs had to impose a Hut Tax, of which 100/0 
went to the chief (Samatar, 1999:44-45 and Mogalakwe, 1997:27). Aside from the Hut 
Tax, about 46% of migrant workers' earnings were returned directly or indirectly to 
Botswana (Dale, 1995:144). Although it was financially lucrative to work in South 
Africa, migrant labour decreased the agricultural manpower in Botswana, and weakened 
traditional practices and customs (Dale, 1995: 145). Migrant labour led to a growth in 
private property and commercialization of what had previously been collective property 
(i.e. cattle, labour and land). This gradually dissolved traditional bonds in Botswana 
(Samatar, 1999:52). Migration to South Africa declined since 1976 due to a move to 
more capital intensive industry in South Africa and pressure on South African company's 
to employ local black workers, which made transporting workers from Botswana a less 
attractive option (Dale, 1995:148). 
During the colonial era, there was no real attempt at regulating employment relations in 
Botswana by the colonial government, as Botswana was to merely act as a labour reserve 
for South Africa, and there were few employment opportunities available in Botswana 
(Takirambudde & Molokomme, 1995: (A)Bl). 
After independence, Botswana received a lot of attention due to its free and open 
elections, its policy of non-racialism and its rapid economic success. The state and 
political institutions took a leading role in infrastructura1 and economic development In 
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1965 Botswana's economic difficulties were labeled as chronic. Cattle in the country was 
of a poor grade, and agricultural land only yielded a crop every 3 years due to drought. 
But in 1980, the World Bank called Botswana the best economic performer in Africa 
since 1970. Since independence, roads, education, health and water provision had 
improved dramatically, which led to an increase in the standard of living of Batswana 
(Picard, 1987:2 and Samatar, 1999:3). Formal employment in Botswana grew from 25 
000 in 1973, to 224 000 in 1992 (Samatar, 1999:3). 
During the time of colonial rule, there was no real political party in Botswana, with only 
after the 1960's a political party being established (picard, 1987:123 and Samatar, 
1999:54). Traditional rulers maintained control of their tribes as the colonial authorities 
encouraged a non-political social order and relied heavily on chiefs to administer colonial 
policies (Samatar, 1999:40). This legacy continued to influence policy making and 
political control after independence, especially considering that one can draw parallels 
between the current political elites and pre-colonial traditional leaders (picard, 
1987: 11 + 13+ 147). 
The post colonial government was constrained in its choice of economic development 
policy due to the total neglect of the colonial rulers and the fact that, at independence, 
there was no strong, indigenous capitalist class. As such, the state assumed total control 
of economic and social development (picard, 1987:13-14 and Takirambudde & 
Molokomme, 1995: (A)B2), which is evidenced by the fact that there was a 50010 increase 
in posts in the public service between 1967 and 1969. The fact that the government took 
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complete control over development of the country is illustrated by the fact that from 1972 
to 1990, the government had a regulation in place that private sector wages and salaries 
were not permitted to exceed that of the public sector. To this end, the government 
established the Wages' Policy Committee, which received proposals for increases in 
wages in the public, private and parastatal sectors (Mogalakwe, Molatlhegi & Otlhogile, 
1997:81, Takirambudde & Molokomme, 1995: (A)B2. This incomes policy of 
government was geared towards job creation and development through wage restraint, 
and it greatly circumscribed employee relations in terms of collective bargaining, as it 
had to fit in with the framework of the incomes policy (Takirambudde & Molokomme, 
1995: (A)B3). The development path chosen by the post-colonial government stressed 
capital accumulation by the private sector, and this required that the government develop 
mechanisms in order to ensure that this is possible, and this was done by controlling the 
working class (Mogalakwe, 1997:29). 
Before World War n, Africans only held menial clerical positions within the public 
service, and the lowest levels of the police force. After the war, Africans started 
demanding more advancement opportunities within the public service. The first African 
district officer was appointed in 1951, and the next appointment was only made on 1959. 
Throughout the 1950's it was assumed that expatriates were needed to ensure efficiency 
in the public service. As such, a more attractive pay structure was offered to expatriates 
than to local Batswana. Despite demands from Batswana to receive equal pay for equal 
work and for opportunities for advancement, colonial 8.dministrators argued that giving 
Batswana equal pay would just widen the gap between rural peasants and African 
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bureaucrats, and opening up posts to Africans would lower efficiency (picard, 1987:82-
84). 
In 1961, the Ramage report created a basic structure for the public service, which was in 
operation until 1978, and it abolished racially based staff divisions by creating four main 
classes of public servants: administrators and professionals, technical and executive, 
clerical and the subordinate industrial class. The policy adopted at that time, and which 
was maintained by the post-colonial government, was one of gradualism, i.e. gradually 
incorporating more Africans into the higher echelons of the public service. In 1962, the 
public service was overloaded with expatriates. Only four of 155 administrative and 
professional staff were Batswana, only 15 of 260 were Batswana in the technical 
category, only 22 out of 182 in the mid-level executive category were Batswana (Picard, 
1987:84-85). 
The 1962 White Paper stated that for at least 10 years Batswana would have to work 
alongside expatriates. The White Paper made estimates on training needs to meet 
demands. But in 1972, it was seen that these estimates were too conservative to meet the 
needs of the rapidly expanding public service (Picard, 1987:86). From independence the 
government repeatedly stressed its policy of gradualism. The government's choice of 
strategy for economic change stressed mining and urban and infrastructure development, 
which needed experts. This policy has always held priority over localization of the public 
service (picard, 1987:206+211). Since the inception of the new government, opposition 
parties and the Botswana Civil Service Association criticized the colonial government for 
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blatant discrimination (picard, 1987:88), and criticized the new government for the slow 
pace oflocalization. 
5.2 THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
5.2.1 The dual role of the state as employer and the government 
The main way in which the dual role of the state impacts on employee relations in the 
public service of Botswana is the fact that the state uses its role as government to deny 
public servants many rights granted to private sector employees. 
The development strategy adopted by the post-independent government necessitated 
control over the work force to ensure development. As such, the state as employer used 
its role as the government to effectively put a cap on minimum wages not only in the 
public sector but also the private sector, so as to ensure that escalating demands for 
higher wages from labour would not impact negatively on economic growth. By 
unilaterally controlling and determining wages and salaries in public sector, and then by 
legislating that the private sector could not exceed public sector salaries, the government 
exercised complete control over all wages and salaries in Botswana. 
5.2.2 Political influences 
Politics, per se, is a relatively new concept in Botswana, with the first political party only 
being established after the 1960's (Picard, 1987:123 and Samatar, 1999:54). Similarly, 
their was no true struggle for independence as evidenced in South Africa and Namibia, 
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with mass mobilization of civil society to overthrow a government perceived to be 
illegitimate. As such, there is no strong political identity identifiable amongst Batswana 
employees. In this way, politics does not impact on employee relations. 
However, the fact that the government has taken on a very paternalistic and Unitarist 
stance towards public service labour relations, is a political influence in itself. Public 
service employee relations are markedly different from private sector employee relations 
due to the fact that all considerations of public service employment are political 
considerations. For example, public service salaries impact on the budget of the entire 
country and appointments also tend to be political moves. The latter is especially so in 
Botswana, where the government, from independence, encouraged the appointment and 
retention of expatriates in order to ensure that efficiency is maintained in the public 
service. 
Another way in which political influences impact on employee relations in Botswana is 
the fact that the government discourages civil interest groups (e.g. trade unions) from 
lobbying the government directly to influence government decision making (Mogalakwe, 
1997:30) 
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5.3 CONTEMPORARY EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND THE EXERCISE OF 
VOICE 
5.3.1 The structure of employee relations in the public service 
Private sector employee relations are regulated by the Employment Act of 1982 (which 
came in to force in 1984), the Trade Unions and Employer's Organisations Act of 1983 
and the Trade Disputes Act of 1982, all of which were amended in 1992 (Takirambudde 
& Molokomme, 1995: (A)Bl and Mogalakwe, 1997:80). There is no express provision in 
any of these statutes conferring on employees the positive right to engage in collective 
bargaining. However, Mogalakwe et al (1997:78) state that collective bargaining is 
encouraged by the fact that it is relatively easy to form trade unions, and there is a 
statutory obligation on employers to recognize and bargain with a registered union. This 
applies to the private sector only, as the Employment Act excludes any officer or servant 
of the government from the definition of an employee, unless the Minister has declared 
such an officer or servant to be an employee. It is only the group of employees classified 
as the industrial class in the public service that have been declared to be employees in 
terms of the Employment Act (Takirambudde & Molokomme, 1995: (A)B6 and 
Mogalakwe, 1997:83). 
Employee relations in the public sector of Botswana are covered by an array of different 
pieces of legislation. The public service is regulated by the Public Service Act, whilst 
teachers are covered by the Unified Teaching Service Act, employees of local 
government are covered by the Unified Local Government Service Act, and the daily 
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rated industrial class employees are covered by the Employment Act (Mogalakwe et al, 
1997:68). It is only government employees employed in the parastatals and those 
employed in the industrial class that are permitted to form and join trade unions, and they 
are also permitted to engage in collective bargaining (Mogalakwe et al, 1997:78). The 
fact that the public service is regulated by such a variety of statutes has meant the . 
creation of disparate terms and conditions of employment for employees in the same 
sector (Mogalakwe et al, 1997:85). 
Similar to the private sector, and probably even to a greater extent, prior to independence, 
there was no real public service employee relations in Botswana. The public service was 
made up mostly of expatriates, with local Batswana only holding menial clerical 
positions. It was only after independence that any attempts at managing employee 
relations came into being in the Botswana public service. The perspective from which the 
post-independent Botswana government seems to operate in the management of 
employee relations in the contemporary public service of Botswana is a Unitarist 
perspective, as the government maintains unilateral control over all decisions regarding 
public service employment. One can also identify certain characteristics of "sophisticated 
paternalistic unitarism and union avoidance" in the employee relations system in the 
Botswana public service, such as training and career development, stable employment, 
other mechanisms for participation, provision of social services, etc. (Finnemore, 
1999: 176). From the inception of independence, the government has taken a very 
paternalistic stance to employee relations in the public service. It has assumed complete 
control over employee relations, by maintaining control over the setting of terms and 
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conditions of employment and by structuring the public service in a way to meet the 
needs of the development strategy of the government 
5.3.2 The exercise of voice in the public service 
Employees in the public service of Botswana have not been given any legal avenue for 
the positive use of voice in the setting of their terms and conditions of employment The 
Public Service Act prohibits public service employees from forming or joining trade 
unions, and they are not permitted to engage in any form of collective bargaining with the 
employer. However, the Constitution empowers the President to enable the setting up of 
consultative bodies, where the state may consult with employees through the Botswana 
Civil Servants Association. Public officers in Botswana may belong to staff associations, 
for the purposes of engaging in consultation with the state (Mogalakwe et al, 1997:74+78 
and Mogalakwe, 1997:92). 
Public servants in Botswana are mostly organized by the Botswana Civil Servants 
Association (BCSA), which is the main body that consults with the government Local 
authorities' officers are represented by the Botswana Unified Local Government Service 
Association (BULGASA). Other associations in the public service include the Botswana 
Teachers' Union, the Botswana Federation of Secondary School Teachers and the 
Botswana Primary School Teachers' Association (Mogalakwe et al, 1997:75). These are 
the associations that consult with the government on the consultative forums established 
by the President 
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Pennanent and pensionable public service employees are pennitted to engage in two 
levels of consultation. The first is at the Ministerial Consultative Committee. The second 
is at the Central Joint Staff Consultative Council, which considers tenns and conditions 
of employment, and it advises on means of improving productivity, working conditions 
and staff relations. However, this is only an advisory body, with absolutely no decision 
making power (Mogalakwe et al, 1997:80 and Mogalakwe, 1997:92-93). As there is no 
fonn of collective bargaining for public servants, nor any other fonn of joint decision 
making, the state maintains the prerogative to determine all conditions of service, 
including salaries (Mogalakwe et al, 1997:75). Furthennore, the BSCA is allowed 
representation at the National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council (NEMIC). 
NEMIC advises the government on economic trends and, from this, makes 
recommendations on what adjustments to salaries and wages would be appropriate for 
public servants. However, labour is outweighed at NEMIC, as it is made up of seven 
pennanent secretaries, fours members from the private sector, and three members from 
the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions, and only one BCSA representative 
(Mogalakwe et al1997:75+81). 
There is evidence in the Botswana media that public servants, through their associations, 
do exercise the limited amount of voice they do have. For example, from the Daily News 
Online (www.gov.bw/cgi-binlnews.cgi) archives one can draw articles regarding plans 
for teacher's demonstrations, and the BCSA criticizing the government for various 
matters, including the lack of consultation. A major example of this is the 2001 
appointment of a consultancy to review salaries and conditions of employment of 
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Batswana public servants. However, this was done without any consultation with or 
participation of the associations of representing public service workers. This drew a lot of 
criticism from these associations, as they feel aggrieved that their view point was not 
considered in such an important matter (Anon, 2001(a)). 
As it is only the industrial class workers within the public service who are permitted to 
form and join trade unions, engage in collective bargaining and participate in strikes, the 
workers' struggle in the public service have been spearheaded by these employees, 
through the Manual Workers Union, which is the biggest union in Botswana. In 1968 
these workers went on a ten day strike due to a wage dispute. They went on another strike 
in 1991, which was termed the biggest strike in the history of Botswana, with 40 000 
strikers. The result of the 1991 strike was that the government declared that it had made a 
policy offering all industrial class employees appointment as permanent and pensionable 
employees, and that all new industrial class workers would be appointed as permanent 
and pensionable staff. This was an attempt by government to avoid future conflict by this 
class of workers, as by becoming permanent and pensionable, they would now also no 
longer be permitted to belong to a trade union, negotiate with the government, or go on 
strike (Mogalakwe, 1997:119+126). The National Joint Industrial Coordinating 
Committee is the mechanism available to industrial class workers for the purposes of 
collective bargaining, and it is established in terms of the Industrial Class Regulations of 
1975, as amended. Negotiations regarding terms and conditions of employment on this 
forum occur at a centralized level (Mogalakwe, 1997:79). 
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Hirschman (1970:77), in his analysis of the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty in 
describing the ways in which consumers of a product or employees react to drops in 
standards, states that the loyalty option comes into play where exit and voice co-exist. 
The loyalty option stimulates the creative use of voice, whilst at the same time holding 
exit at bay. Within the Botswana public service, the voice option is not a very viable 
option to use as employee are only permitted to consult, but yet there is no widespread 
"exit" of public servants. What this indicates is that there must be another factor that 
bolsters the loyalty option. In the case of Botswana, I will argue that it is due to the fact 
that public servants are offered much better terms of employment than private sector 
employees. In the Botswana public service there is job security, incremental salaries and 
job mobility. In addition, the government has spent a lot of resources on training public 
servants (Mogalakwe et al, 1997:85). These factors mean that employment with the 
government is a "good job", which means that despite not being able to engage 
meaningfully with the employer, public service employees may be of the opinion that 
they are better off than they would be in the private sector. 
It is important to note, however, that since the government enabled the private sector to 
determine its own wages and salaries in 1990, private sector salaries and wages have 
increased much more than those in the public sector. This has led the associations in the 
public sector to call for the government to align salaries of public servants with their 
counterparts in the private sector. The fact that the government has claimed it is unable to 
do so, has led to the exit of certain professionals in the public service, such as nurses, 
79 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
who claim to get better offers abroad, and teachers, who have been the most vociferous in 
their exercise of voice regarding their poor salaries. 
80 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
SECTION 6: SYNTHESIS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
6.1 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE - FROM 
COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE 
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana all come from a long colonial history. However, 
these histories differ remarkably from one another, due to the differing types of 
colonizatio~ and the difference in the form and extent of colonial intervention in the 
country. The era of colonial rule in these countries has left an indelible impression on 
post-colonial employee relations in the public service of these three countries. The extent 
and type of colonial intervention shaped the development path of these countries, and this 
influenced the choices available to the post-colonial government regarding how it is 
going to manage employee relations in the public service. 
The common history of employee relati ns shared between these three countries is the 
fact that, historically, public servants have not been pennitted to participate in any way in 
the setting of terms and conditions of employment, nor were they permitted to fonn or 
join trade unions, or participate in industrial action. Traditionally, allover the world, 
public sector employee relations have developed separately than private sector employee 
relations, with separate and more restrictive legislation governing public sector employee 
relations. This was justified by the idea of the sovereignty of the state, and it was 
accompanied by unilateral determination of terms and conditions of employment by the 
state as the employer (Morris & Fredman, 1993:115, Heinecke~ 1993:2 and True, 
1987:1). The traditional view of public administration was that public servants were 
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providing an honourable service to the community, and public servants were anonymous 
and politically neutral (Heinecken, 1993:2 and Hughes, 1994:23). Public administration 
was placed under direct political control, based on a hierarchical bureaucracy, with 
politicians deciding on policies, and public servants only implementing these policies 
(Hughes, 1994:23). 
This traditional view of public administration came under severe criticism during the late 
1980's and early 1990's, which resulted in a shift in many developed countries from 
rigid, hierarchical and bureaucratic public administration, to flexible, market-based 
management practices. The traditional public sector came under criticism due to claims 
that the public sector was oversized and consuming too many scarce government 
resources, and involved in too many functions that the private sector could also perform. 
These criticisms came in the wake of an international move to neo-classic economic 
practices, and due to globalization, which put governments under far greater pressure to 
be internationally competitive. The new type of public management has been 
characterized by a greater emphasis on achievement of objectives and greater flexibility 
in terms of organisations, personnel and terms and conditions of employment, with stress 
placed on setting personal objectives and measuring these through performance indicators 
(Hughes, 1994:1,9-11,15+59). 
With this paradigm change regarding the management of the public sector, also came the 
change to include public servants under the same legislation governing private sector 
employee relations. This meant that public servants were, in many countries, entitled to 
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collective bargaining, as well as being entitled to form and join trade unions and 
participate in industrial action, albeit with certain restrictions. 
South Africa and Namibia have, to a large extent, followed this international trend of 
extending employment rights to the public service. This has been done by including 
public servants in the same legislation governing private sector employees, and, as such, 
extending collective bargaining rights and freedom of association rights to public 
servants. Botswana has not followed the international trend of governing private and 
public servants under the same legislation, and employee relations in the Botswana public 
service remain highly controlled by the state as the employer. 
South Africa is much more developed than any of the other two countries under 
consideration here. Prior to the 1994 democratic elections, great efforts were expended to 
develop the country due to its strategic importance for travel and trade routes, as well as 
the country's rich mineral wealth. South Africa also has a longer history of employee 
relations in both the private and the public sector than Namibia or Botswana. As such, 
after 1994, the state was able to introduce into the public service a more advanced 
method of employee relations. Another important reason why one could argue the South 
African government chose to extend employment rights to public servants is due to the 
fact that labour played a pivotal role in the liberation struggle, and it was important for 
the newly elected democratic government to keep labour "on its side" in order to ensure 
stability in the new democratic state. 
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In comparison to Botswana, Namibia was developed to a far greater extent by the 
colonial state. As in South Africa, the reason for this was also due to its strategic 
importance for trade routes and its rich mineral wealth. Employee relations in Namibia 
mimicked to a large extent employee relations in South Africa, with legislation 
implemented by the Transitional Government of National Unity in the late 1980's almost 
directly replicating similar legislation in South Africa at that time. In Namibia, labour 
also played a pivotal role in the liberation struggle, so it was also important for the newly 
elected government to not alienate labour by not including public servants in the labour 
legislation. 
The colonial history of Botswana is very different from the colonial history of South 
Africa and Namibia. The colonial administration wanted to expend as few resources as 
possible on Botswana due to the fact that it was believed that Botswana did not have 
much mineral wealth to exploit, and due to the initial plans for the eventual transfer of 
Botswana to South Africa. This led to many years of neglect. The newly elected 
democratic government inherited a country with very poor social and economic 
infrastructure. The development strategy adopted by the new government was severely 
circumscribed by these years of colonial neglect, and the strategy necessitated a large and 
highly controlled public service, as development was to be state led. This is a possible 
reason why the Botswana government followed a more Unitarist route in public service 
employee relations. 
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Budd (2004:95) states that there are four fundamental questions regarding employee 
relations that need to be asked in order to determine the dominant perspective within an 
employee relations systems. These questions are: is labour a commodity?; are employers 
and employees equals in a self-regulating competitive labour market?; is there an inherent 
conflict of interest between employers and employees?; and is employee voice 
important? As stated earlier, the answer to these questions will give one an indication of 
the employee relations perspective within that specific employee relations system. Figure 
2 diagrammatically depicts to which type of employee relations system the answers to the 
above questions lead. Examining this diagram within the context of this study reveals the 
type of employee relations system identifiable within the public services of South Africa, 
Namibia and Botswana. Starting with the fist question: is labour a commodity? This 
question deals with the nature of labour. Labour can be viewed as a commodity in the 
production process, or it can be viewed as composed of human beings. In the first 
conceptio~ people only work to earn a living. As such, the "invisible hand of the free 
market" is the form of employee relations system which sets terms and conditions of 
employment. In the second conceptio~ work has certain psychological and social 
functions that stretch beyond mere financial reward (Budd, 2004:95-97). In none of the 
public services under consideration here is labour viewed as a mere commodity. The 
human aspect of employment seems to be taken into account. This may be due to the 
nature of the public sector employment, where there is no direct production or market 
involved. It may also be due to the historical view that public servants are providing an 
honourable service to the community. 
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Looking at the second question: are employers and employees equals in self-regulating, 
competitive labour markets. In the neo-classical paradigm of employee relations where 
the free-market sets terms and conditions of employment, it is believed that employers 
and employees are equals. Employees are seen as having their labour to sell in the 
market, and they are "free" to move from less favourable conditions to more favourable 
conditions by selling their labour to the "optimum" buyer. The other perspective, where 
employers and employees are not equals, holds that the unequal power between 
employers and employees may lead to competition between employees, which could lead 
to an erosion of democracy and substandard working conditions (Budd, 2004:96-97). In 
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana there appears to be an underlying assumption that 
the employer and employees are not equals. This may also be due to the nature of public 
sector employment, where the state, in its role as government, holds certain executive 
authority which employees cannot challenge. 
A negative response to the first two questions means that an employee relations system 
that is not governed by the market must be sought. This brings one to the third question: 
is there an inherent conflict of interest between employers and employees? In one view, 
there is no inherent, insurmountable conflict of interest between employers and 
employees and it is believed that effective policies and practices can align the interests of 
employers and employees. This is a Unitarist perspective of employee relations. The 
other view is that there is an inherent conflict of interest between employers and 
employees, where the goals of employees for higher wages, better benefits and 
favourable working conditions clash with employers goals of reducing labour costs and 
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increasing output. In the fIrst view, external sources (e.g. trade unions and government 
regulation) are deemed not to be required as a check on managerial prerogative. Whereas 
in the second view, external sources are required. The second view is a plumlistic 
conception of employee relations (Budd, 2004:97). 
In pre-1994 and pre-1991 South Africa and Namibia (respectively), from the side of the 
employer, there appears to have been a negative response to this question. Public service 
employment was managed at the sole discretion of the employer. A dual system of 
employee relations was implemented, with a very comprehensive and benefIcial system 
in place for white employees. However, one cannot think that the matter is so straight 
forward, with a simple yes or no answer. An employee relations system is complex, with 
many facets and variables. This is especially so in the public service due to the political 
nature of public service employment. As such, on the face of it the pre-independent 
situation may appear to have a negative response to this question, but if one examines the 
matter further, one may see that there may actually be an affirmative response. The fact 
that employees were prohibited from forming or joining trade unions and the fact that 
there was a dual system of employee relations in place in itself is an admission that there 
is a conflict of interest between employers and employees. It is only in post-democratic 
South Africa and Namibia that there has been an overt admission on the side of the 
employer that there is an inherent conflict of interest between employers and employees. 
The situation in post-independent Botswana is just as complex. It has a wide array of 
policies covering public service employment, and various practices such as training, 
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better remuneration packages, etc., it appears as if the employer does not perceive there 
to be a conflict of interest between employers and employees. Furthermore, the 
assumption appears to be that the various policies within the public service is enough to 
align the interests of the employees with that of the employer. 
The fourth question asks: is voice important? The answer to this question is very 
informative in identifying the type of employee relations system. In pre-independent 
South Africa and Namibia, employee voice was clearly not important. If one then takes 
an affirmative answer to question three, and a negative answer to question four, one can 
see that the type of employee relations system involves government regulation or 
provision. It is postulated that for black employees this may have been the case, as there 
was very strict government regulations regarding the employment of black people in the 
public service. However, for white employees, the situation was different. It is postulated 
that for both questions three and four there would be a negative response, leading to the 
Human Resources Management system of employee relations. As mentioned before, a 
very sophisticated system of policies and practices were put into place for the benefit of 
white employees. This included job security, training, good benefits and high salaries. 
This was to align the interests of the employees with those of the employer, and to ensure 
that public servants would implement the political ideology of the ruling government of 
the day. 
In post-independent South Africa and Namibia, there appears to be an affirmative answer 
to the fourth question. This leads to the independent employee representation employee 
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relations system, which is seen in both these countries by the recognition of trade unions 
and the ability of these trade unions to negotiate and consult with the employer. Within 
the context of the public service of South Africa and Namibia, the independence of these 
employee organisations is questionable due to the political affiliation they have with the 
ruling party, which is also the employer. In South Africa, non-politically aligned unions 
do have an influence at the negotiating table, which, to some extent, ameliorates this 
political influence. But this is only marginally, as the politically aligned unions hold the 
majority at the PSCBC and at some sectoral councils. In Namibia, it is only the politically 
aligned union that sits with the employer at the negotiating table. This negates the 
independence of the union within the bargaining situation, as political interests often 
prevail over workerist interests. 
In the Botswana public service, it seems that the employer does not perceive employee 
voice as important. With a negative response to questions three and four, one is led to the 
Human Resources Management system of employee relations. However, public servants 
in Botswana have been given a limited amount of voice, which rather suggests that the 
answer to question four is affirmative, which leads to the Human Resources Management 
with employer initiated participation. In this sort of system, there is no independent 
representation of employees and the form and the content of participation is dictated and 
controlled by the employer. As such, employees consult with the employer, whilst not 
having a direct impact on decision making, or the ability to negotiate. 
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Figure 2: Intellectual foundations of workplace governance 
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A central feature of employee relations in South Africa, Namibia and Botswana is the 
centralized character of the determination of terms and conditions of employment. In 
South Africa and Namibia. the main bargaining forum for negotiating wages and salaries 
is at the centrallevei and in Botswana terms and conditions of employment are centrally 
determined by the employer. In South Africa. however, bargaining has also been 
decentralized with the establishment of sectoral councils and provincial chambers. 
However, decentralization has only occurred in terms of human resources matters, as all 
substantive matters are still negotiated at the central forum, i.e. the PSCBC. In terms of 
collective bargaining, there are certain advantages to having centralized negotiations. For 
the employer, this is the institutionalization of conflict and removing conflict from the 
workplace (Klerck, 1998:90 and Finnemore, 1999:245). For labour, the advantages 
include rationalizing their bargaining activities and expanding their membership and 
influence (Klerck, 1998:97 and Finnemore, 1999:244). This latter is an important 
consideration within the South African and Namibian public service, as many unions 
have severe capacity constraints, and having to expend scarce resources only at one 
central forum ameliorates these constraints to some extent. Another key advantage of 
centralized bargaining is that it tends to formalize personnel practices, making them less 
vulnerable to managerial discretion in matters of discipline, work assignments, dismissals 
and promotions (Kochan & Katz, 1988:449). 
Internationally there has been a trend to decentralize bargaining in the public sector by 
devolving more power to managers at local level. It is only in South Africa that there is 
evidence of following this trend, albeit, as said earlier, this is only regarding human 
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resources issues. Adiar and Albertyn (2000:830) are of the opinion that complete 
decentralization is not a feasible option in the South African context due to the vast 
geographical inequality in the country. Decentralizing would create an even bigger gap 
between the richer and poorer provinces, and the richer provinces would be enabled to 
pouch the best the employees. This is also the case in Namibia, where there is a great 
disparity between the various regions of the country, with the majority of wealth situated 
in the central region. Decentralizing bargaining would, in Namibia, also increase this 
divide between the different regions. Another reason why decentralization of bargaining 
in South Africa and Namibia is not a viable option is the fact that in both countries the 
state's budget is determined centrally. In developed countries such as the USA, where 
there has been extreme decentralization of bargaining, this is possible because financial 
authority has also been decentralized (Kochan & Katz, 1988:435). As such, for 
decentralization to have any significant meaning or impact,. there also needs to be 
concomitant devolution of managerial power downwards. 
6.2 THE UNIQUE NATURE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE 
The fact that the state is both the employer of the public service and the government has a 
profound impact on employee relations in the public service. The two main reasons for 
this is that the state is responsible and accountable to the wider public, and the fact that 
the state's source of revenue is through taxation. The fact that the state is responsible for 
the general public means that all considerations of public service employment are 
political considerations and they impact on the wider public (Morris & Fredman, 
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1993:123). As mentioned earlier, the fact that the state is responsible to the wider public 
has led some commentators to say that granting exclusive rights of representation and 
negotiation to public service trade unions gives them undue political power and access to 
government decision-making, which closes off these avenues for other interest groups, 
and they have used this argument to justify their claim that it is inappropriate for 
employment rights to be extended to public servants. Kochan and Katz (1988:423) state 
that this position overestimates the actual power of trade unions in the public service. 
This is indeed true, as negotiated increases in the public services of South Africa and 
Namibia have not been higher than those in the private sector. Also, trade unions in the 
public service have not had an ''unfair advantage" in gaining access to scarce government 
resources. In fact, in both South Africa and Namibia, the government has been seen to 
lobby labour through the political alliance to garner support on various contentious 
issues, such as restructuring and privatization. 
The states main source of revenue is through taxation. This is different from the private 
sector, where revenue is created through the sale of goods or service, and revenue may be 
increased by maintaining a competitive position in the market (Morris & Fredman, 
1993:123). The main way in which the state could increase its revenue is through 
increasing taxation. This is a political move that would receive wide spread opposition 
from the public. Wages and salaries of public servants make up a large portion of 
government spending, and it is a prime target for cost-cutting when the government has 
to decrease its expenditure (Kochan & Katz, 1988:426 and True, 1987:2). The 
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government is under pressure to provide greater and better services, whilst at the same 
time being under pressure to reduce costs (True, 1987:2). 
The state is bound by certain macro--economic and political factors in its dealings with 
public service employees. Prior to independence, the election manifesto of both the ANC 
(in South Africa) and SW APO (in Namibia), contained certain socialist elements, putting 
labour at the forefront of their campaign, and claiming that labour is an integral role 
player in ensuring the success of the democratization process. As suc~ at the inception of 
independence in both these countries, labour was very much involved in the drafting of 
new labour legislation, and various other policies affecting labour, such as the 
Constitution. However, in both instances, soon after independence, the ruling party all but 
abandoned these socialist ideals as it came under increased pressure to limit public debt, 
decrease government expenditure and reduce tax levels. This has led to many claims from 
labour in both South Africa and Namibia, that the ruling party has deserted its members, 
and that it is putting the needs of capital ahead of the needs of labour 
(Donnely, 1999: 196). 
The fact that the state is constrained in its choices and activities by its macro-economic 
policy has an impact on negotiations between public service employees and the state. 
This is because all agreements with financial implications have to be approved by a 
higher authority than the bargaining forum, i.e. Parliament. This impacts on the actual 
ability of public service unions actually having an impact on decision-making, as 
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Parliament can override agreements reached at the bargaining forum (Morris & Fredman, 
1993:125 and Baskin 2000:175). 
The economic development strategy of the Botswana government has had the clearest 
impact on employee relations in that country. The strategy of the country was developed 
in order to overcome the years of colonial neglect and development was to be completely 
state led. This led to a massive increase in public sector employment, whilst at the same 
time contributing to the fact that the state assumed complete control over the terms and 
conditions of employment for public servants. This was due to the fact that the 
development strategy of the government hinged on a stable labour market, without 
pressures from the public or private sectors to increase wages and salaries too much. As 
such, until 1990, the government also controlled private sector wages and salaries by 
decreeing that private sector wages and salaries could not exceed that of the public sector. 
6.3 THE EXERCISE OF VOICE IN TIlE PUBLIC SERVICE 
As mentioned in the previous section, traditionally employees in the public sector were 
not permitted to engage in any form of collective bargaining. It is only with the change in 
the conception of public service management that employees in the public sector have 
been given this right, as well as the right to form and join trade unions and participate in 
industrial action. Kochan and Katz (1988:423) state that the normative premises of 
employee relations are that there is inherent conflict of interest between employers and 
employees, that workers should have the right to pursue their interests through a union 
and that collective bargaining is one way in which unions may represent the interests of 
95 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
their members. They go further to state that these premIses apply to all 
employee/employer relations, although in the public sector there is the difference that the 
interests of society at large need to be borne in mind as well. It is due to this reason that 
some commentators have said that the primary responsibility of the government is 
towards the public in general, and it is inappropriate to allow a sectional interest group 
(Le. public service unions and employees) to wield undue political power by gaining 
access to government decision-making, as this closes off this avenue for other interest 
groups (Wellington & Winter, cited in Kochan & Katz, 1988:423 and Kochan, 
1980:445). Kochan (1980:44) states that this perspective does not take into consideration 
the fact that public servants and their unions are primarily concerned with their terms and 
conditions of employment, and not the broader political goals of the general public. 
Budd (2004:24) states that the issue of employee voice is linked to the concept of 
democracy. He says that in a democracy, citizens are given the right to influence the 
politics in their country, and, as such, they should also be given the right of industrial 
democracy. All three countries under consideration here claim to be democracies. In fact, 
in all their Constitutions the right of freedom of association is protected. However, it is 
only in South Africa and Namibia where this right is positively linked to the right to 
bargain collectively with the employer. The ability for public servants to bargain 
collectively for public servants in South Africa and Namibia has been legislated. 
However, the actual articulation of this into practice differs between South Africa and 
Namibia, for various reasons. These reasons include the differing capacities of the 
unions, the greater sophistication of employee relations in South Africa in defining 
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bargaining units and the political commitment of the South African government to 
participation. 
Botswana public servants have only been given the right to consult with the employer, 
through structures developed by the employer. As suc~ they have no true voice in having 
a meaningful impact on decision-making affecting their terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Morris and Fredman (1993:125-126) caution that one should not be fooled by the 
semantics of collective bargaining and consultation in the public service, and one should 
not use it as a criteria for measuring the degree of influence public servants have on the 
determination of their employment conditions. The reason they give for this is that not 
only is the range of issues allowed to be bargained over circumscribed in the public 
service, but the fact that Parliament has the ability to overrule any collective agreement 
through its executive authority, means that the state may unilaterally implement any 
provision it sees fit. This is indeed so, both in South Africa and Namibia, where there 
have been incidents of the government unilaterally implementing matters, despite the 
provision for collective bargaining that exist. In effect, one could make an argument for 
the fact that in several instances, public servants in Namibia and South Africa, actually 
also only consult with the employer, as the form of collective bargaining in these two 
public sectors does not necessarily mean they have an impact on decision making. 
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When one is looking at the issue of voice, it is better to think. of voice existing along a 
continuum. lIDs continuum ranges from complete managerial control, to consultation, to 
collective bargaining, to complete worker control. lbinking of voice in this manner is 
especially infonnative in the public service, as even in instances where collective 
bargaining is legislated, there are still elements of both managerial control and 
consultation involved within that system. Within the limits of voice given to the public 
servants in the countries under consideration, these public servants do attempt to 
influence their terms and conditions of employment. The actual success of this voice in 
gaining the increases and changes asked for varies between the countries, as well as 
varying with different issues under consideration. 
A common issue between these countries appears to be the fact that professionals, such as 
teachers and nurses, are the most vociferous in their use of voice regarding complaints 
about their salaries. In all three countries, teachers and nurses demand higher salaries and 
have gone on demonstrations and strikes to support their claims. lIDs shows them using 
the voice option. However, there is also evidence of the exit option having been used in 
all three countries by nurses and teachers. In both Namibia and Botswana, newspaper 
reports cite figures of teachers and nurses who have left the country for better packages 
abroad (Anon, 2001(b) and Anon, 2002 and Amapadhi, 2002). Hirschman (1970) states 
that exit and voice are both potentially good means to notify management of the decline 
in the conditions of service. He also warns, however, that they need to occur within 
certain bounds in order to allow management the time and the opportunity to rectify the 
deteriorated state of affairs. The exodus of skilled professionals, such as teachers and 
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nurses from the public service in these countries does not bode well for service delivery 
in two of the sectors providing the most important services to the community, i.e. 
education and health. 
The history of organisations representing the interests of public service employees has an 
impact on the ability of these organisations to effectively participate with the employer. 
True (1987:9) states that the origin and composition of public sector unions differ from 
those in the private sector, as public sector unions were mostly born out of staff 
associations, which were structured mostly around occupational lines. In the case of 
South Africa, this is indeed true as several staff associations of the pre-1994 era have 
changed into unions for the purposes of collective bargaining. The unions in the public 
service in South Africa are also greatly structured around occupational lines, with 
separate unions for teachers, nurses and the police. This fragmentation of labour inhibits 
the ability of labour to speak with a united voice when engaging with the employer at the 
bargaining forum. The different historical and ideological backgrounds of unions in the 
South African public service also serves as an impediment to the ability of labour to 
engage as a collective, united front with the employer. Several unions in the South 
African public service played a key role in the liberation struggle, and they are the more 
militant and politicized unions. Other unions, however, were traditionally white unions, 
organizing mostly white collar workers. These unions benefited from the apartheid state's 
policies, and therefore did not form part of the liberation struggle. As such, these unions 
serve very diverse members, with very diverse interests, and their agenda is often in 
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conflict with one another. According to Patel (2000a: 130 and 2000b: 175), this "multi-
unionism" in the South African public service renders cooperation extremely difficult 
In Namibia, there is no history of organisation of public servants in the pre-independent 
era, with only teachers having been obliged to belong to an association. It was only in the 
late 1980's that unionization of public servants began. There are only two unions in the 
Namibian public service that have been granted recognition by the government to engage 
in collective bargaining. NAPWU covers all public servants that are not covered by 
NANTU (i.e. all non-teachers). This highlights a difference between South Africa and 
Namibia regarding the participation of labour with the employer. As there is only one 
union engaging with the employer in Namibia during negotiations, there are no factional 
interests rendering the process more complicated. However, this has not led to greater 
success of Namibian public servants to participate effectively with the employer. In fact, 
the South African unions are far better equipped to participate with the employer, and 
have in fact been more successful in making gains for their members through the process 
of negotiation than is the case in Namibia. The fact that the government only negotiates 
with the politically aligned union shows the influence of politics on employee relations. 
The SW APO party has a lot of influence over NAPWU. This renders the efficacy of 
collective bargaining a moot point, as rather than it being a means of public service 
employees to have a positive influence on their terms and conditions of employment, it is 
used by the government to control labour within the public service. 
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Similar to Namibia, the differentiation in representation of public servants in Botswana is 
also only between teachers and the rest of the public service (aside from Local 
Government). 
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SECTION 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
The main objectives of this dissertation has been to give an account of employee relations 
within the public services of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, and to determine what 
type of voice regulation exists in the determination of terms and conditions of 
employment within this employee relations system. Employee relations in the public 
service is a complex and multi-faceted matter, as it is impacted upon by politics, macro-
economics and the wider social, economic and historical background of the country. 
Employee relations in the public service also impacts on the country as a whole in terms 
of service delivery as well as the financial resources of the state to deliver social and 
economic services to the wider electorate. The type of employee relations system 
identifiable within a specific public service, and the choices made by the state as 
employer in its employee relations system for public servants is constrained by several 
factors, including the political climate of the country, historical development of the 
country as well as its economic development strategy. 
This section of the dissertation will highlight the main differences and similarities in the 
public service employee relations systems in South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. In 
short, one can see from the evidence gathered that there are far more similarities between 
South Africa and Namibia than between these two countries and Botswana. A possible 
reason for this could be the close historical link between South Africa and Namibia, as 
Namibia was "administered" by South Africa during the time of colonial rule. This meant 
that laws, regulations and practices from South Africa were passed on to Namibia. Since 
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this time labour legislation (amongst other legislation) has continued, to a large extent, to 
mimic that of South Africa. 
Botswana, on the other band, had a different political and economic history than that of 
South Africa and Namibia It obtained independence through a democratically elected 
government much earlier than South Africa and Namibia, and was faced with a very 
particular set of social, political and economic circumstances upon independence, which 
has necessitated a particular path of industrial relations development, which has 
continued to set it aside from South Africa and Namibia. 
The similarities between the public service employee relations systems of South Africa, 
Namibia and Botswana may be summarized as follows: 
• South Africa, Namibia and Botswana share a long history of colonialism. The 
specific type of colonialism differs between these countries, as the colonizing 
state intervened and developed these countries in different ways, and to different 
extents. The social, economic and political infrastructure inherited by the new, 
democratically elected government in all these countries constrained and shaped 
the choices available to these governments in their choice of public service 
employee relations. 
The similarities between the public service employee relations systems of South Africa 
and Namibia may be summarized as follows: 
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• In South Africa and Namibia the labour movement played a pivotal role in the 
struggle for independence, and the democratically elected government adopted a 
Pluralist perspective of employee relations after independence, evidenced in the 
fact that labour had played a key role in drafting new labour legislation, and other 
policy matters. lbis also means that freedom of association and collective 
bargaining has been legislated for all employees, and public servants have, as 
suc~ been given the opportunity to influence the setting of their terms and 
conditions of employment. However, the actual articulation of this into practice 
differs between South Africa and Namibia, due to several reasons, which include 
the political will of the government as employer and the capacity of the unions 
organizing public servants. 
• Politics playa large role in employee relations in South Africa and Namibia due 
to the political affiliation and historical link between the ruling party and the 
major unions operating in the public service. lbis political affiliation has led to 
several problems in the employee relations system, which includes the fact that 
several commentators in both countries say that the state as employer bypasses the 
bargaining structures in order to co-opt the union through the political alliance. 
The different historical and ideological backgrounds of the unions in the public 
service also inhibit labour from engaging with the employer as a united body. 
The main difference between the public service employee relations systems in South 
Africa and Namibia may be summarized as follows: 
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• In South Africa many unions are active within the public service, and the 
negotiating forums are characterized by multi-unionism. This is different in 
Namibia, where the general public service is only organized by two unions, of 
which only one negotiates with the employer. This may be due to the fact that 
South Africa has a longer and stronger history of unionization than Namibia 
• In South Africa, public service negotiations occur at different forums (i.e. per 
sector), as well as at different levels (i.e. national, sectoral and provincial). In 
Namibia there is only one negotiating forum for the entire public service, which is 
located at the national level, although teachers do have their own negotiating 
forum. 
The differences between the public service employee relations systems of South Africa 
and Namibia, on the one hand, and Botswana on the other hand may be summarized as 
follows: 
• Whereas in South Africa and Namibia the labour movement played a pivotal role 
in the struggle for independence, in Botswana the situation is very different, as the 
independent government inherited a severely under developed country, and had to 
expend all its energies and resources to develop the social and economic 
infrastructure of the country. As such, the government adopted a Unitarist stance 
towards employee relations in the public service, where public service 
employment was used as an instrument to spearhead the state led development 
strategy of the country. As such, public servants have not been given the rights of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, as the state has used its incomes 
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policy in the pubic service to determine wages and salaries in the private sector, 
so as to avoid high demands from labour inhibiting economic development. 
Public servants are permitted to participate with the state as employer on a 
consultative basis, through structures determined by the employer. 
• Politics play a large role in employee relations in South Africa and Namibia due 
to the political affiliation and historical link between the ruling party and the 
major unions operating in the public service. In Botswana there is no political 
affiliation between organizations representing employees and the ruling party, in 
fact the government actively discourages sectional interest groups from lobbying 
it directly. 
As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, this study bas looked at the institutions within 
the employee relations system, as well as the impact of interest organizations on the 
setting of terms and conditions of employment. This strategy has highlighted the official 
channels which employees (through their representative bodies) have to influence the 
setting of terms and conditions of employment. However, it must be remembered that 
within any employee relations system there is always the formal channels of 
communication, negotiation, consultation, etc., but alongside it there is an informal 
system. This is how the actors (individually and collectively) use aspects of the 
institutions within the employee relations system to, for example, influence the setting of 
terms and conditions of employment. 
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APPENDIX A: PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES 
South Mrican Interviewees 
DATE OF PLACE OF 
NAME ORGANISATION 
INTERVIEW INTERVIEW 
MR.COETZEE May 2002 CapeTown SAOU (WESTERN CAPE) 
MR.DEBRUYN June 2003 Pretoria GPSSBC 
MR.GILBERT June 2003 Pretoria PSA 
MR.HUGO June 2003 Johannesburg SADTU 
MS.HULUMAN June 2003 Pretoria PSCBC 
MR.KRUGER April & CapeTown PSA (WESTERN CAPE) 
October 2003 
MS. LEROUX June 2003 Pretoria DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
OFFICER - PSCBC 
MR. LOSI October 2002 CapeTown DENOSA (WESTERN 
CAPE) 
MR. MAGADLELA October 2002 CapeTown NEHA WU (WESTERN 
CAPE) 
MR. MAGAGULA June 2003 Pretoria DENOSA 
MR.MANYAKA June 2003 Pretoria HOSPERSA 
MR. MATAITSANE June 2003 Pretoria NUPSAW 
MR. MCKENZIE May 2002 CapeTown SADTU (WESTERN 
CAPE) 
MR.ROOS May 2002 CapeTown WESTERN CAPE 
PROVINCIAL 
BARGAINING COUNCIL 
(EMPLOYER 
REPRESENTATIVE) 
MR.SIKO June 2003 Johannesburg NEHAWU 
MR. VANWYK October 2002 CapeTown PA WUSA (WESTERN 
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CAPE) 
MR. X (wishes to June 2003 Pretoria DPSA 
remain anonymous) 
MS. X (wishes to September 2002 CapeTown INVOLVED IN DISPUTE 
remain anonymous) RESOLUTION IN THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
MR. Y (wishes to May 2004 Pretoria DPSA 
remain anonymous) 
MR. Z (wishes to May 2004 Pretoria DPSA 
remain anonymous) 
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Namibian interviewees 
DATE OF PLACE OF 
NAME ORGANISATION 
INTERVIEW INTERVIEW 
MRMUHEUA July 2004 Windhoek PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION (Industrial 
Relations) 
MR.SIMATAA November Windhoek PUBLIC SERVICE 
2004 COMMISSION (Public 
Sector Management, 
Undersecretary) (Employers 
negotiating team) 
MR. VAN ROOYEN July 2004 Windhoek PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION 
MR VANZYL July 2004 Windhoek PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION (Job 
evaluation and grading) 
MR JATAMUNUA August 2005 Windhoek PUBLIC SERVICE UNION 
OF NAMIBIA 
MR.. BRANDT May 2004 Windhoek PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION 
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